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Summary
The aim of this study was to examine the dimensionality o f  obsessive beliefs and 
their relationship to the varied symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD). Research and expert consensus has suggested that six belief domains are 
most relevant to OCD and suggest that these domains are closely related. In the 
first study 136 student participants completed measures o f  belief domains, OCD 
symptoms, and anxiety and depression. Correlation and principal component 
analysis suggested that belief domains were not in fact distinct. A partial 
correlation analysis demonstrated that summed scores o f all the obsessive belief 
domains were significantly related to all measured OCD symptom subtypes, 
with the effects o f  anxiety and depression partialled out. Obsessive belief was 
most related to obsession symptoms and least to washing and neutralising 
symptoms. Potential clinical implications are suggested. Recently another belief 
construct concerning the ego-dystonic nature of intrusive thoughts has been 
implicated in the development and maintenance of OCD. The second study 
therefore attempted to determine the psychometric properties of the first 
available measure of this construct. 116 student participants completed this 
measure. Principal components analysis was used to replicate findings of an 
initial validation study with a student sample conducted by the authors of the 
scale. The analysis confirmed that ego-dystonic beliefs had four dimensions that 
could be characterised as Implication of Thoughts for Personality, Inconsistency 
of Thoughts with Morality, Dislike of Thoughts and Irrationality of Thoughts. 
Clinical and theoretical issues arising from both studies are discussed.
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THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF OBSESSIVE BELIEFS AND THEIR
ASSOCIATION WITH OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMS.
Summary: The assumption that beliefs about obsessions are critical in the 
development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is 
inherent in cognitive behavioural models of the disorder. An international group 
o f OCD experts has therefore identified six beliefs as being the most relevant to 
OCD. Evidence suggesting the association of each of these beliefs and OCD 
symptoms is reviewed, focusing on those studies that compare the relative 
importance of belief domains or suggest close relationships between them. 
Evidence from recent studies suggests there is a higher degree of relationship 
between domains than supposed. This has contributed to difficulties both in 
comparing the relative importance of domains and their differential association 
with OCD symptom subtypes. Overall evidence to date suggests that the six belief 
domains are all associated with varied OCD symptoms. In principle all belief 
domains may therefore warrant therapeutic attention. Further research assessing 
the relationship o f individual belief domains with OCD symptoms is indicated 
with a greater focus on investigating the relationships between beliefs.
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Introduction
Intrusive thoughts have been found to be present in the majority of people and to 
have similar content to clinical obsessions (Rachman & De Silva, 1978; 
Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984). Following these observations, cognitive models 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) propose that it is the negative appraisal 
of intrusive thoughts that is crucial in development and maintenance of the 
disorder, not the occurrence of intrusive thoughts per se (Salkovskis, 1985; 1989; 
Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997; 1998; Wells 1997; 2000). Such appraisals 
it is thought lead to a number of related consequences, which ultimately cause 
obsessions. These include adverse mood, attempts to suppress thoughts, avoidance 
and rituals which in turn are maintained by anxiety reduction, prevention of 
disconfirmation of dysfunctional beliefs, and increased frequency and salience of 
intrusive thoughts (See Rachman, 1997, Salkovskis, 1999). The result is a 
worsening spiral o f intrusive thoughts and control attempts that are the typical 
features of OCD. According to cognitive theory appraisals are hypothesised to be 
derived partly from beliefs or assumptions (Beck et a i, 1985). There has been 
increasing interest therefore in the nature of beliefs that may influence the way in 
which intrusive thoughts are appraised.
Speculation on the nature o f the beliefs that characterise people with OCD has 
come from differing theoretical backgrounds (e.g. Beech & Liddell, 1974; Carr, 
1974; Clark & Purdon, 1993; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Guidanno & Liotti, 1983; 
Mallinger, 1984; McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; Rachman, 1993; Reed, 1985;
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Salzman, 1968; Salkovskis, 1985; 1989; Van Oppen & Amtz, 1994; Wegner, et 
al., 1987; Wells, 1997). From a cognitive-behavioural perspective delineation of 
OCD related beliefs is thought to be clinically important for a number of reasons. 
Almost 25 percent of patients refuse traditional exposure and response prevention 
therapy (ERP) (Stanley & Turner, 1995) so belief modification therefore can help 
patients to attempt it (Freeston et al., 1996), or serve as a viable alternative 
treatment (Ladoceur et al., 1996; Jones & Menzies, 1998b). Furthermore some 
authors suggest that direct modification of critical beliefs may actually result in 
more effective treatment than ERP and /or lower relapse rates (Rachman,1997; 
1998; Purdon & Clark, 1999).
Empirical evidence however linking OCD relevant beliefs to symptoms has not 
led to consistent findings. Clark (2000) states that: ‘A number of cognitive 
constructs have been proposed as the core process in OCD. It is still not clear 
which of these beliefs and appraisals are more or less central to the disorder and 
so should be the target of intervention.' Problems evident in this research include 
a lack of consensus as to the type of beliefs that are most likely to be important 
and a proliferation of overlapping measures that create difficulty in comparing 
findings across studies. Additionally most research has been conducted on non- 
clinical samples. An international group of over 25 OCD expert researchers have 
been meeting therefore to advance the study o f cognition in OCD [Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997; 2001)]. Initially they 
identified 16 instruments that were judged to assess 19 different domains of 
beliefs thought to contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD. Using
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expert consensus ratings the group agreed that six major belief domains were 
likely to be important: inflated responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, 
overestimation of threat, importance of controlling thoughts, intolerance of 
uncertainty and perfectionism (see Appendix B for definitions). Subsequently 
measures of each domain were constructed by selecting items from existing 
instruments. These were circulated to all members who proposed changes, and 
scales were modified accordingly, in a repeated process of expert review. Scales 
items were finally discarded for their lack of relationship to OCD symptom 
measures and reverse-scored items were also deleted partly on this basis. This 
resulted in the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ: OCCWG, 2001) with 
subscales measuring the above domains.
Outline of the Review
The first part o f this review will indicate the empirical evidence that has suggested 
the association of the above belief domains with OCD symptoms (see also 
OCCWG, 1997; Steketee et al., 1998b). To varying degrees however evidence has 
accumulated for association of each of the above constructs with OCD confirming 
that several belief domains are implicated. In addition recent studies have 
observed a high degree of interrelationship between these constructs (Steketee, el 
al., 1998a; OCCWG, 2001). The second section of the review will, therefore, 
focus more attention on studies that have tested the relative importance of 
constructs simultaneously and/or considered the relationship between them. The 
third section of the review will focus in depth on studies that have examined a
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wider range of beliefs and symptoms, which include an initial validation study of 
the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire. Where possible analysis of differing 
associations between beliefs and subtypes of OCD symptoms will be reported.
Belief domains and OCD symptoms
Inflated Responsibility
The most studied belief domain is that of inflated responsibility. Measures o f 
inflated responsibility have been significantly correlated with OCD symptoms in 
many non-clinical samples (Freeston et al, 1992; Freeston et al., 1993; Rheaume,
et al., 1994; Rheaume et al., 1995a; Wilson & Chambless, 1999; Rheaume, et al.,
2000; Mancini et al., 2001). In a regression analysis, Salkovskis et al. (2000) 
found responsibility scales accounted for a third of the variance in OCD symptom 
scores, after controlling for anxiety and depression in a mixed sample.
Obsessional patients have also been found to have elevated levels of perceived 
responsibility compared to non-clinical controls samples (Ladoceur, et al., 1999; 
Foa et al., 2001), and anxious controls (Steketee, et al., 1998a; Salkovskis et al., 
2000; OCCWG, 2001). In addition, Ladoceur et al. (1999) found no significant 
difference between patient groups with washing, checking and mental ritualising 
symptoms on responsibility scores. Only experimental studies however can 
provide evidence that beliefs are a cause rather than a consequence of symptoms. 
Researchers have successfully manipulated responsibility levels and demonstrated 
associated changes in OCD symptom related variables in clinical checkers
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(Lopatka & Rachman, 1995), in cleaners and checkers (Shafran, 1997), and in 
non-clinical samples (Ladoceur, et al., 1995; Ladoceur et al., 1997). It has been 
noted however that both perceived responsibility and estimated probability of 
threat were similarly affected by the responsibility manipulation in these studies 
(Ladoceur et al., 1995; Shafran. 1997). Therefore it is not clear which o f  these two 
variables produced the results or whether both were necessary (Ladoceur et al.,
1995).
Overestimation o f  Harm
The importance of overestimation of danger as well as inflated responsibility 
beliefs in OCD has been emphasised by Van Oppen & Amtz (1994), which was 
confirmed inadvertently by studies manipulating perceived responsibility (noted 
above). In addition obsessive-compulsive patients have shown higher levels of 
risk aversion than non-clinical controls (Steketee & Frost, 1994), and 
overestimation of threat scores were elevated significantly in a diagnosed OCD 
sample compared to non-clinical, and non-OCD anxious controls (OCCWG, 
2001). However overestimation of threat is a significant characteristic o f other 
anxiety disorders (Butler & Matthews, 1983). Additional evidence comes from 
studies of compulsive washers. Danger expectancies ratings have been 
significantly associated with compulsive washing symptoms in a clinical sample 
(Jones & Menzies, 1997a), and experimentally manipulating danger expectancies 
has led to changes in OCD washing symptoms (Jones & Menzies, 1998a).
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Perfectionism
Perfectionism was considered a major OCD belief domain by the OCCWG (1997) 
but it was not thought ‘necessarily exclusive to people with OCD.’ In non-clinical 
samples dimensions of perfectionism have been linked with hoarding (Frost & 
Gross, 1993), checking (Gerschunny & Sher. 1995), checking and cleaning (Wade 
et al., 1998) and other obsessive compulsive symptoms (Frost et al., 1990; 
Rhiaume et al., 1995a; Bhar & Kyrios, 1999; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Rheaume et 
al., 2000). Only one study has reported correlations of perfectionism beliefs and 
OCD symptoms in OCD patients (Ferrari, 1995). Also levels of perfectionism 
have been found to be higher in clinical groups compared to non-clinical controls 
(Antony et al., 1998; Ladoceur et al., 1999; Frost & Steketee, 1997; OCCWG, 
2001). However OCD patients have been shown not to differ from other anxiety 
disorder patients on total perfectionism scores (Frost & Steketee, 1997; Antony et 
al., 1998; OCCWG, 2001). These results confirm the notion that perfectionism 
beliefs are associated with OCD symptoms, but they are not uniquely associated 
with OCD compared to other anxiety disorders.
Overimportance o f  Thoughts
The overimportance of thoughts belief domain identified by the OCCWG (1997) 
largely correspond to Thought-Action Fusion (TAF) beliefs first identified by 
Rachman (1993). TAF beliefs are thought to have two components. Probability 
TAF refers to the belief that a thought about an event can make it more probable.
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Morality TAF refers to the belief that thoughts about unacceptable deeds are 
morally equivalent to committing them (Shafran el al., 1996). To date most 
research relevant to the overimportance o f thoughts belief domain has been 
conducted with a measure of TAF (Shafran et al., 1996). TAF scores have been 
demonstrated to correlate significantly with measures of OCD symptoms in non- 
clinical samples (Rachman et al., 1995; Shafran et al., 1996; Emmelkamp & 
Aardema, 1999; Muris et al., 2001; Rassin et al., 2001a; Coles et al., 2001). 
Experimentally increasing levels of TAF in a non-clinical group has also been 
associated with increases in the frequency o f intrusive thoughts (Rassin et al., 
1999). Using a sample of OCD patients Shafran et al. (1996) found only 
probability TAF and checking were significantly associated. In another OCD 
patient sample mostly non-significant relationships between TAF and OCD 
symptoms were found (Rassin et al., 2001b). Furthermore OCD patients did not 
have significantly higher TAF scores than patients suffering from other anxiety 
disorders (Rassin et al., 2001a), and TAF scores have been linked more strongly 
to general psychopathology measures than OCD symptom measures in a clinical 
sample (Rassin et al., 2001b). Evidence to date therefore suggests that the 
demonstrated links between TAF beliefs and OCD symptoms in non-clinical 
samples are weaker in clinical samples, and that TAF beliefs are not specifically 
linked to OCD symptoms. The one study that has used a specific overimportance 
of thoughts scale found that scores were higher in OCD patients compared to 
normal and non-OCD anxious controls, and were significantly correlated with 
OCD symptoms in a mixed sample (OCCWG, 2001).
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Perhaps the least researched belief domains identified by the OCCWG (1997) are 
the need to control thoughts and intolerance of uncertainty. In non-clinical groups, 
beliefs about thought control have been associated with frequency of intrusive 
thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 1994a, 1994b), and obsessional thoughts and washing 
compulsions (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). Intolerance o f uncertainty beliefs 
have been found to be related to general anxiety disorder symptoms to a greater 
extent than OCD symptoms in a non-clinical sample (Dugas et al., 2001). A scale 
measuring intolerance of uncertainty however was found to be the only one to 
contribute to variance in OCD scores, beyond mood and worry, in a regression 
analysis including other belief scales and clinical participants (Steketee et al., 
1998a) (see below for discussion). Importance of controlling thoughts and 
intolerance of uncertainty beliefs have also been found to be significantly elevated 
in OCD samples compared to non-clinical and non-OCD anxious controls 
(Steketee et al., 1998a; OCCWG, 2001), and to be significantly correlated with 
symptoms in a mixed sample (OCCWG, 2001). Further research examining the 
relationship of both these domains to OCD symptoms is needed in clinical 
samples. As heightened ‘cognitive self consciousness’ is argued to be a 
characteristic of obsessional patients (Wells, 1997), beliefs about the importance 
of thought control may be especially salient in clinical samples.
Intolerance o f Uncertainty & Importance o f  Controlling Thoughts
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The relative importance of belief domains and relationships between them
(initial studies)
Inflated responsibility and Overestimation o f  Harm
After observing the important role that perception of danger played in their study 
Ladoceur et al. (1995) note that danger expectancy is integral to current 
definitions of inflated responsibility [i.e. ’beliefs of possessing pivotal power to 
provoke or prevent crucial negative consequences...’ (see Salkovskis, et al.,
1996)]. They ask therefore ‘Do people feel responsible after having perceived 
threat or do they perceive threat because they already feel responsible?’ Based on 
the direction of manipulation in her study, Shafran (1997) argues that perceived 
responsibility leads to an estimation of risk. However manipulations of 
responsibility in clinical samples have been observed to affect both hypothesised 
components of perceived danger (i.e. perceived likelihood and perceived 
consequences of an event) (Lopatka & Rachman 1995; Shafran, 1997). It seems 
likely that manipulating estimates of risk would also lead to changes in perceived 
responsibility as is suggested by Ladoceur et al., (1995). Rheaume et al. (1995b) 
propose that estimation of probability and severity of harm is a necessary but 
insufficient condition (without perceived responsibility) for the development of 
OCD. Conversely Menzies et al. (2000) suggest that excessive danger 
expectancies are the ‘driving force' behind OCD behaviours, and that 
responsibility is one o f  many variables that influence danger expectancies by 
affecting perceived severity of outcomes.
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Fortunately, one study has attempted to clarify the respective roles of personal 
influence (responsibility) and negative consequences (danger) by controlling for 
their effects, in a non-clinical sample (Ladoceur el al., 1997). Influence and 
negative consequences components of perceived responsibility were both 
manipulated experimentally creating four conditions (combined, influence, 
negative consequences and control), and the effects on checking behaviour 
(hesitations, checking and modification) during a classification task were 
recorded. Hesitations were provoked by increasing either component of perceived 
responsibility i.e. influence or negative consequences, while negative 
consequences alone (but not influence alone) were sufficient to produce checking. 
For modifications neither component alone was sufficient to produce an effect. 
Overall this suggests that there is some evidence that perception of danger alone 
can lead to obsessive-compulsive behaviour, but that both components together 
produce stronger effects. In conclusion it is evident that danger and inflated 
responsibility beliefs are closely linked, if not embedded in one another, and play 
a role in the development of OCD. Clearly there is a need for further clarification 
of their respective roles and relationship.
Perfectionism, Inflated Responsibility and Danger Beliefs
With growing evidence that perfectionism, responsibility, and danger related 
beliefs were associated with OCD symptoms attempts were made to empirically 
test their relative importance. In a regression analysis with student participants,
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responsibility accounted for more variance than perfectionism in OCD symptom 
scores (Rhiaume et al., 1995a). Perfectionism scores were still significantly 
associated with symptoms when the influence of responsibility was partialled out 
however, and the authors proposed that the role of perfectionism had been 
previously underestimated. To study the interaction between inflated 
responsibility and perfectionism, Bouchard et al. (1999), divided student 
participants into highly perfectionist (HP) and moderately (MP) perfectionist 
groups, and responsibility was manipulated in both conditions. Checking 
behaviours increased in both high responsibility conditions. Although the HP 
group did report higher levels of responsibility than the MP group, checking 
behaviours were not significantly higher in the HP group. As a result it was 
proposed that perfectionism may predispose individuals to feel responsible and 
could be conceived ‘as playing a catalytic role in the perception of responsibility.’ 
In a non-clinical sample, Rheaume et al. (2000), attempted to determine the 
relative association of responsibility, perfectionism and perceived danger to 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Correlations between perfectionism and the 
responsibility scales were in the moderate range and it was assumed different 
constructs were being measured, but a high correlation between perceived 
responsibility and danger indicated a close relationship. All three variables were 
significantly correlated with OCD symptom scores (including most symptom 
subtypes). Results of a regression analysis suggested that responsibility and 
perfectionism had a similar and significant degree of association with symptoms, 
which was far greater than that of perceived danger. However perceived danger
18
was only assessed with two items. The authors argue that compared to 
responsibility, perfectionism ‘may also play an equally important role in OCD.’
Examination of the roles of danger expectancies, responsibility, and 
perfectionism, in a sample o f obsessive-compulsive handwashers found 
contrasting results to the above studies (Jones & Menzies, 1997a). In a partial 
correlation analysis, when responsibility ratings were held constant, severity of 
illness ratings remained significantly related to four OCD variables. Neither 
perfectionism nor responsibility ratings however were found to be significantly 
related to any of the four OCD dependent variable measures when danger 
expectancy ratings were held constant. Jones and Menzies (1997a) concluded, in 
contrast to the above studies that emphasise responsibility and perfectionism, that 
outcome or danger expectancies are the most likely mediators of washing related 
behaviour in OCD. A criticism of all of the above studies is that their design did 
not control for the co-occurring association o f  anxiety and depression symptoms 
with OCD symptoms. Overall it is difficult to draw conclusions from them other 
than they provide further evidence that perfectionism, responsibility and danger 
beliefs are implicated in OCD. Further research is indicated using reliable and 
valid measures of the three variables, especially in clinical samples with varied 
compulsions.
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Inflated Responsibility and Thought Action Fusion beliefs
Inflated responsibility beliefs have been thought of as being theoretically 
connected to thought-action fusion beliefs (Rachman & Shafran, 1999). It has 
been suggested that it is TAF beliefs that make OCD patients prone to experience 
a sense o f  inflated responsibility (Shafran et al., 1996; Rachman, 1997; Wells
1997). This was indicated by a psychometric analysis of a responsibility scale that 
demonstrated that only one c f the derived factors (TAF) was significantly related 
to OCD symptoms (Rachman et al., 1995). Salkovskis et al. (2000) state that 
beliefs about overimportance of thoughts (which as noted are similar to TAF 
beliefs) are incorporated by their definitions of beliefs concerning inflated 
responsibility. Not surprisingly, significant correlations have been found between 
the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS: Salkovskis et al., 2000) and TAF-scale 
(Shafran et al., 1996) and were shown respectively to predict similar amounts of 
variance in OCD symptoms, after controlling for the influence of thought 
suppression (Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001). Salkovskis & Freeston (2001) state 
that more empirical work is necessary to know whether ‘it is more heuristic to 
consider thought-action fusion as an integral part o f responsibility or as a separate 
but closely linked entity.’ Further confusion arises from the proposed relevance of 
a tripartite view of fusion of beliefs (i.e. thought action fusion, thought-event 
fusion, thought-object fusion) in understanding OCD (Wells, 2000), and again 
more empirical work is suggested (Wells, personal communication, 2000).
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Studies relating multiple belief domains to OCD symptoms
Steketee, Frost & Cohen (1998)
The development of an instrument to measure belief domains in OCD (OCCWG, 
1997; 2001), appears to have inspired studies that relate a wider range of beliefs to 
OCD symptoms. For example, Steketee et al. (1998a), attempted to assess the 
relative importance of four belief domains identified by the OCCWG 
(responsibility for harm, need to control thoughts, overestimation of threat and 
intolerance of uncertainty) to OCD symptoms. Beliefs were measured by a 
questionnaire created for the study, using items from existing instruments, and 
new ones generated by the first two authors (who are co-chairs o f the OCCWG). It 
is not clear however how similar these scales are to the finalised belief domain 
subscales reported by the OCCWG (2001). Significantly higher scores were 
obtained by OCD patients on all belief scales compared to anxious and normal 
controls, and all beliefs were significantly correlated with two OCD symptom 
measures (in a combined sample). In their hierarchical regression analysis, the 
tolerance of uncertainty scale was the only belief measure that contributed 
significantly to variance in OCD symptom scores, beyond mood and worry (in the 
mixed OCD and control group sample). Although this study appears to indicate 
the relevance of the above belief domains, particularly intolerance of uncertainty, 
to symptoms of OCD, these results have to be treated with caution. Salkovskis et 
al. (2000) highlighted several methodological limitations. Items on the belief 
measure devised for this study were selected specifically because they correlated
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with the measure of obsessional symptoms used. There was criterion 
contamination in many of the items in all scales (e.g. threat estimation items 
referred to obsessional symptoms), and clinical and non-clinical groups were 
determined by using cut-off scores of obsessional measures. Additionally it 
should be emphasised that high correlations (ranging between .74 and .82) among 
belief domains raised the interesting question of ‘overlap between constructs’ 
indicating that domains may be ‘difficult to differentiate.’ Their utility however as 
independent variables for comparison in regression analyses therefore also has to 
be questioned.
Emmelkamp & Aardema (1999)
It has been suggested that research is necessary to isolate the specific contribution 
of proposed beliefs to specific symptoms (Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999; Wells, 
2000). Emmelkamp & Aardema’s (1999) study is the only one to date that has 
specifically attempted to assess the relationship of a wide range of OCD beliefs to 
different OCD symptoms. Obsessive compulsive belief domain scales were 
derived from an initial item pool created from other instruments by the OCCWG 
(1997). Further items were added and scales were then modified on 
comprehensibility and psychometric grounds. Some of the resulting scales bear a 
superficial resemblance to belief domains identified by the OCCWG (1997) (e.g. 
risk probability, responsibility, thought action-fusion, overimportance given to 
thoughts, magical thinking, consequences of having thoughts, control, inverse 
inference). The authors make clear however that their measure is unrelated to the
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Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ: OCCWG, 2001). For instance magical 
thinking and thought action fusion beliefs would be contained within the 
overimportance o f thoughts domain identified by the OCCWG. Although not 
reported in full, it was indicated that correlations between these domains were all 
less than .62. In addition the significance level of correlations between symptom 
subscales and belief domains were not reported. The symptom measure used was 
the Padua-Revised (PI-R: Van Oppen el al., 1995) which has been criticised for 
not measuring certain categories o f obsessions and compulsions such as 
neutralising and hoarding (Foa et al., 1998). It has also been shown that its 
obsessional subscales appear to measure worry (Freeston et al., 1994). Most of 
the results from a regression analysis using a large non-clinical sample were 
unaffected after controlling for depression and the authors argue ‘that specific 
domains of obsessional beliefs account for specific obsessive compulsive 
behaviour in a meaningful way'. For example thought-action fusion accounted 
for significant variance in washing and checking symptoms but not in impulses, 
precision and rumination symptoms. Risk probability accounted for significant 
variance in washing, checking and precision but not impulses and rumination 
symptoms. Inflated responsibility explained only a small part of the variance in 
precision symptoms. The consequences of having thoughts domain used in the 
study (example item: ‘I believe that if I lost control over my thoughts, I might 
eventually develop a psychological problem’) appears to be similar to the 
importance of controlling thoughts domain identified by the OCCWG (1997). It 
accounted for significant variance in rumination and impulses, but not washing, 
checking, and precision symptoms. Additionally control and overimportance of
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thought belief domains did not account for significant variance in OCD symptom 
scores. Due to the unclear relationship between domains used and ones identified 
by the OCCWG however it is not possible to draw firm conclusions from this 
study. In addition some belief scales have modest reliabilities (e.g. .63), and low 
item content (e.g. four).
OCCtVG (2001)
An initial validation study o f the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ: 
OCCWG, 2001), related all subscales (reflecting the domains considered by this 
review) to another revised version of the Padua Inventory (PI-WSUR: Bums et 
al., 1996) in a large mixed sample. The symptom measure is subject to similar 
criticisms as those noted above for the PI-R. The study also showed that reliably 
diagnosed OCD patients scored higher than patients with other anxiety disorders, 
community and student controls on all subscales except perfectionism. The 
anxiety disorder group included only 12 patients however thus weakening the 
possible conclusion that these belief domains are especially pertinent to OCD 
patients. One of the most notable results was that the belief scales (i.e. 
overestimation of threat, control of thoughts, importance o f thoughts, tolerance of 
uncertainty and perfectionism) were all highly correlated (ranging between 0.60 
and 0.81, p<0.005). In a mixed sample, each belief scale was significantly related 
to the total OCD symptoms score (p<0.001). Overestimation of threat had the 
strongest relationship to symptoms followed by, responsibility, tolerance of 
uncertainty, perfectionism, control of thoughts and importance o f thoughts. All
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results remained significant when they were controlled for anxiety and depression. 
With few exceptions each symptom subtype was significantly associated with 
each belief domain, when anxiety and depression scores were partialled out. These 
results suggest that all belief domains are broadly associated with the majority of 
OCD symptoms. They also suggest overestimation of threat beliefs have the 
strongest overall relationship to symptoms. However the observed degree of 
relationship between belief domains and the selection of belief scale items 
according to their relationship with the OCD measure used (using the same 
sample for item selection as validation) does compromise these conclusions. It 
also makes further speculation on the relationship of individual belief domains 
with specific symptom subtypes seem premature. The authors of this study 
suggest that future research examining correlations with particular symptom 
profiles should use different forms of assessment. Perhaps most importantly 
however they state that ‘question of overlap between putatively separate 
constructs’ will have to be ‘addressed extensively in subsequent validation 
studies.’ Whether the high observed correlations between belief domains result 
from the particular properties of these belief domain sub-scales, or the domains 
not in fact being distinct, remains open to empirical investigation. Clearly there is 
a need for further research using the OBQ.
Conclusion
There has been growing interest in beliefs held by people with OCD. Expert 
consensus rating has suggested that six belief domains are likely to be most
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relevant to OCD (inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, 
overestimation of threat, importance of controlling thoughts, overimportance of 
thoughts and perfectionism). Empirical evidence has now accumulated to support 
the relationship o f each of these domains to OCD symptoms. However there is a 
relative lack of research using intolerance o f uncertainty and importance of 
controlling thoughts belief domains. There is also evidence that overestimation of 
threat, overimportance of thoughts, intolerance of uncertainty and perfectionism 
belief domains may be equally relevant in other anxiety disorders. In addition only 
threat estimation, inflated responsibility and thought-action fusion beliefs have 
been manipulated experimentally providing support for the view that these beliefs 
are causes rather than consequences of symptoms.
With the recognition that several belief domains are associated with OCD 
symptoms, research has focused on relating more than one belief simultaneously 
to OCD symptoms, to compare their relative importance. This has provided 
further support for the relationship of importance of danger related beliefs, 
perfectionism and thought-action fusion beliefs to OCD symptoms. Conclusions 
regarding their relative importance have been contradictory however. Empirical 
studies have also suggested close relationships between threat-estimation, 
thought-action fusion and inflated responsibility beliefs and there is a need for 
further research to clarify the relationships between them. Furthermore, recent 
studies have suggested a high degree of relationship exists between all six belief 
domains.
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The few studies that have related a wide range of beliefs to global OCD symptom, 
or specific symptom profiles, have yielded contradictory findings. Inconsistent 
results, different belief and symptom measures, methodological inconsistencies 
and the high observed relationships between domains make it difficult to draw 
conclusions. It is not possible therefore to state the relative importance of belief 
domains to OCD symptoms globally or suggest meaningful patterns of 
relationships between the six belief domains and specific symptom subtypes. The 
validation study o f  a scale including all six belief domains in fact indicates that all 
domains are significantly associated with all symptom subtypes. The high degree 
of association between domains in this study does however weaken this 
conclusion. Therefore it is still unclear if it will be possible to confidently 
establish the relative importance of these particular belief domains to OCD 
symptoms generally, or meaningful patterns of relationships between them and 
specific symptom profiles. Further research is needed that relates a wide range of 
beliefs to a wide range of symptoms, in clinical OCD, anxious control and non- 
clinical samples. However research also needs to establish whether the belief 
domains derived by expert consensus are less distinct than once thought.
The main clinical implication of the above research is that all six belief domains 
should be assessed in OCD patients. It seems likely that patients with varied 
symptoms will hold all of these beliefs to varying degrees. Individual 
formulations, including the decision about what cognitions should be targeted, 
may therefore be assisted by use of the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire. 
Cognitive techniques used to challenge these beliefs have been described by
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Freeston et al., 1996. To date there is evidence that targeting inflated 
responsibility beliefs alone (Ladoceur et al., 1996) and danger related beliefs 
alone (Jones & Menzies, 1998b), in OCD patients (without exposure and response 
prevention) is associated with a reduction in symptoms. Overall the reviewed 
research suggests, at least in principle, that targeting other belief domains may 
also result in symptom reduction. A high degree of relationship between belief 
domains also implies the interesting possibility that belief modification in one 
domain may result in reductions in other domains.
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OBSESSIVE BELIEFS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO OBSESSIVE-
COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMS
Summary: Relationships between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and beliefs 
identified as relevant to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are investigated 
among university students. In total 136 Participants completed measures of OCD 
related beliefs, OCD symptoms, and anxiety and depression. Results confirmed 
that belief domains were strongly associated and were not sufficiently separate to 
use individually in further analysis. The summed obsessive belief score was 
significantly correlated with all obsessional symptoms, measured with the effects 
of anxiety and depression partial led out. Obsessional belief appeared to be most 
related to obsession symptoms and least related to neutralising, washing and 
checking symptoms. Potential reasons for the relationships between domains are 
discussed and possible clinical implications are suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) broadly propose that 
the negative appraisal of intrusive thoughts is crucial in the development and 
maintenance of the disorder (Salkovskis, 1985; 1989; Clark & Purdon, 1993; 
Rachman, 1997; 1998; Wells, 1997). Various belief domains have been 
implicated as influencing negative appraisals, and therefore as being associated 
with OCD symptoms. It is still not clear however which o f these beliefs are most 
influential (Clark, 2000), or if belief domains have specific relationships to 
symptom subtypes. One of the main research problems has been the multitude of 
proposed beliefs and instruments to measure them. A group of international OCD 
experts has therefore identified, by consensus ratings, the six most relevant belief 
domains: inflated responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, importance of 
controlling thoughts, overestimation of threat, intolerance o f uncertainty, and 
perfectionism. [Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working group (OCCWG, 
1997)]. The group has also developed, and conducted an initial validation study, 
of a questionnaire to measure these belief domains (OCCWG, 2001).
Empirical support for the association o f the above belief domains with OCD 
symptoms has accumulated in the last decade (see OCCWG, 1997; Steketee, 
Frost, Rheaume & Wilhelm, 1998b). Additional recent support for the following 
domains includes: inflated responsibility beliefs (Ladoceur, Bouvard, Rheaume & 
Cottraux, 1999; Wilson & Chambless, 1999; Salkovskis, Wroe, Gledhill, 
Morrison, Forrester, Richards, Reynolds & Thorpe, 2000; Mancini, D’Olimpio &
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D ’Ercole, 2001), overestimation of harm (Jones & Menzies, 1997a; Jones & 
Menzies, 1998a), perfectionism (Wade, Kyrios & Jackson, 1998; Ladoceur, et al„ 
1999; Rhéaume, Ladoceur & Freeston, 2000). Most evidence for the
overimportance o f thoughts domain is provided by studies using a measure of 
thought action fusion beliefs (a similar concept) (Rassin, Merckelbach, Mûris & 
Spaan, 1999; Rassin, Merckelbach, Mûris & Schmidt, 2001a; Mûris, Meesters, 
Rassin, Merckelbach & Campbell, 2001 ; Coles, Mennin & Heimberg, 2001). 
There is relatively less evidence for intolerance of uncertainty (Steketee, Frost & 
Cohen, 1998a; Dugas, Gosselin & Ladoceur, 2001), and the importance of 
controlling thoughts belief domains (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). Recently the 
OCCWG (2001) found scores on measures of all the above belief domains, except 
perfectionism, were significantly elevated in comparison to a small group of 
anxiety disorder patients without OCD. There is however evidence that 
intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas et al., 2001 ), overimportance of thoughts 
(Rassin et al., 2001a; Rassin et al., 2001b), perfectionism (Frost & Steketee, 1997; 
Anthony, Purdon, Veronika & Swinson, 1998), and overestimation o f harm 
(Butler & Matthews, 1983) are relevant in other anxiety disorders.
With the recognition however that several beliefs are associated with OCD 
symptoms studies have increasingly sought to establish their relative association 
with OCD symptoms. For example, a regression analysis in a non-clinical sample 
indicated that scores on responsibility and perfectionism measures were both 
significantly and equally associated with symptoms, but danger expectancy scores 
were not significantly associated with symptoms (Rhéaume et al., 2000). In
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contrast ratings of perfectionism and responsibility were not significantly related 
to OCD measures in a sample of clinical handwashers, when the influence of 
danger expectancy ratings were partialled out (Jones & Menzies, 1997a). Danger 
expectancies in this study were however significantly related to OCD measures 
when responsibility and perfectionism ratings were partialled out, indicating that 
danger expectancies were more likely mediators of OCD phenomena than 
responsibility and perfectionism beliefs. It is possible that the conflicting results 
may be partly explained by the disparity between belief measures and samples 
used in these studies.
Another possibility, that complicates the comparison between belief domains, is 
that OCD relevant belief domains are not as distinct as is supposed. Many 
plausible links between them have been suggested. For example, it has been found 
that manipulation of responsibility beliefs caused changes in overestimation of 
harm beliefs (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Ladoceur, Rheaume, Freeston, Aublet, 
Jean, Lachance, Langlois & Pokomandy-Morin, 1995; Shafran, 1997) leading to 
speculation that they may be inseparable (Ladoceur et al., 1995). Inflated 
responsibility and thought-action fusion beliefs are considered to be theoretically 
related (Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995; Rachman & Shafran,
1999) and have been found to be highly correlated with each other (Smdri & 
Holmsteinsson, 2001). Indeed, Salkovskis et al. (2000) propose that inflated 
responsibility, overimportance of thoughts and importance of controlling thoughts 
beliefs are all incorporated by their definition of inflated responsibility. It has also 
been suggested that an exaggerated sense of responsibility or risk may lead people
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to seek greater certainty or attempt to control their thoughts (Steketee et al., 
1998a). Plausible interactions have been suggested between perfectionism and 
responsibility beliefs (Bouchard. Rhéaume & Ladoceur, 1999) and perfectionism 
and intolerance of uncertainty beliefs (Guidano & Liotti, 1983). Overall these 
studies, and the probability o f  further possible connections, suggest empirical 
work is necessary to discover if some beliefs are integral to each other or should 
be considered as separate.
The development of a scale to measure belief domains in OCD (OCCWG, 1997; 
2001) appears to have encouraged studies that relate a wider range of beliefs to 
OCD symptoms. For example, Sleketee et al. (1998a) attempted to assess the 
relative importance of four beliefs identified by the OCCWG (responsibility for 
harm, need to control thoughts, overestimation of threat and intolerance of 
uncertainty), by a measure that was devised for the study. In a regression analysis, 
intolerance o f uncertainty was the only belief measure that contributed to 
significant variance in OCD symptom scores, beyond mood and worry (in a 
mixed sample including people with OCD). However correlations between belief 
scales were high (the majority being over .80), so their utility as independent 
variables in the regression analysis is questionable, and indicates that belief 
domains were indeed closely related. The use of a combined clinical/non clinical 
sample may have however resulted in artificially high correlations. In addition 
items for belief scale measures were selected specifically because they correlated 
with the measure of obsessional symptoms used as the dependent measure, and
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many of the belief scale items referred to obsessional symptoms (see Salkovskis et 
al., 2000), further weakening possible conclusions from this study.
Some researchers have proposed it is also necessary to isolate the specific 
contribution of beliefs to specific symptoms (Emmelkmap & Aardeman, 1999; 
Wells, 2000). In a regression analysis, Emmelkamp & Aardema (1999) assessed 
the relationship of several OCD belief domains, using measures partly derived 
from a preliminary item pool developed by the OCCWG (1997), to specific OCD 
subtypes. In a large non-clinical sample regression analysis indicated that thought- 
action fusion beliefs were significantly associated with washing and checking 
only, risk probability was found to be related to washing, checking and precision 
only, but responsibility explained only a small part o f the variance in one subtype 
of OCD (precision). The ’consequences of having thoughts’ scale appeared 
similar to the importance of controlling thoughts domain identified by the 
OCCWG, and was significantly associated with impulses and rumination 
symptoms only. Although these results are suggestive o f  specific relationships of 
belief domains to symptom profiles, the significance o f  correlations of symptoms 
and belief were not reported, and the relationship of the domains used to the 
domains identified by the OCCWG is unclear. In addition the inflated 
responsibility, risk probability and consequences of having thoughts measures 
showed only moderate reliabilities.
The most comprehensive study to date relating the six identified belief domains to 
OCD symptoms was a validation study of the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire
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(OBQ: OCCWG, 2001), using a large sample consisting of OCD patients, anxious 
controls and normal controls. Correlations of each belief subscale and overall 
OCD symptom scores, controlled for negative affect, were all significant 
(p<0.001). Overestimation of threat beliefs were most highly related to symptoms 
overall, followed by responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism, 
control of thoughts and importance of thoughts in decreasing order. Furthermore, 
all belief scales correlated significantly with all symptom subtypes, and with few 
exceptions, this remained true when correlations were controlled for negative 
affect. The symptoms measure was a revised version of the Padua Inventory 
(Sanavio, 1988) which has however been criticised for not measuring certain 
categories of obsessions and compulsions such as neutralising and hoarding (Foa, 
Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles & Amir, 1998). The above result suggests a more 
uniform pattern o f  relationships than found by Emmelkamp & Aardema (1999). 
Perhaps the most notable result of the validation study however was that 
correlations between the belief domains were all highly significant (p<0.005), 
with the majority being greater than .7. However the authors note that the pooled 
clinical/non clinical sample had higher correlations than either single sample. In 
addition items were selected for the OBQ subscales partly on the basis of their 
high correlation with OCD measures (i.e The Padua). Both of these observations 
weaken the possible conclusion that all six belief domains are highly related to all 
OCD symptoms, and makes it seem premature to suggest specific associations of 
belief domains with symptom profiles. The OCCWG (2001) proposed that further 
research should use different forms of assessment and that the degree of overlap
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between ‘putatively separate’ constructs would be addressed in their future 
validation studies.
Outline o f  study
There is little consensus between the studies that have comprehensively related 
beliefs to specific OCD symptoms. The current study therefore aims to further 
assess the degree of relationship between a wide range of beliefs and symptoms 
using belief measures developed by the OCCWG (2001), and a symptom measure 
that is thought to best capture the full heterogeneity of OCD symptoms (Foa, et 
al., 1998). Individual belief domains will be used as independent variables in a 
multiple regression analysis, with symptom subtypes as criterion variables. 
However if  high correlations are observed between belief domains (as indicated 
by Steketee et al., 1998a; OCCWG, 2001), they will be examined for their 
underlying factor structure and the derived factors will then be used as 
independent variables. The utility of using analogue samples in OCD research has 
been supported (Bums, Formea. Keortge & Stemberger, 1995).
Aims
Due to the inconsistency of findings to date the current study is exploratory. 
Specifically it aims to answer the following questions: If correlations between 
belief domains are high what is the underlying factor structure? Which belief 
domains or derived factors explain most variance in global OCD symptom scores?
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What are the relative associations between belief domains or derived factors and
OCD symptom subtypes?
Participants
METHOD
The non-clinical sample contained 136 student participants (many were mature) 
with a mean age of 29.4 years (SD=10.9) and 103 (75.7%) were female.
Measures
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBO: OCCWG. 1997: 2001) The OBQ is an 87 
item self-report measure to assess endorsement of OCD related beliefs. Its 
subscales are: Control o f  thoughts (14 items), Importance of thoughts (14 items), 
Responsibility (16 items). Intolerance of uncertainty (13 items), Threat estimation 
(14 items), and Perfectionism (16 items). Responses are made on a seven-point 
scale. Initial data support the internal consistency and validity of the scale using 
diagnosed OCD patient, community, student, and non-OCD anxious samples 
(OCCWG, 2001). (See appendix 2)
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (PCI: Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis. Coles & Amir, 
19981. The OCI is a 42 item self-report measure of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Participants rate each item for both frequency and distress on 5-point 
Likert scales. There are seven subscales: Washing (8 items), Checking (9 items),
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Doubting (3 items), Ordering (5 items), Obsessions (8 items), Hoarding (3 items), 
and Mental Neutralising (6 items). Internal consistency reliability ranges, and 
discriminant and convergent validity for distress and frequency scales, have all 
been found to be satisfactory. The scale has been validated with patient samples 
diagnosed by experts as having OCD, other anxiety disorders, as well as non­
psychiatric controls (Foa et al., 1998; Simonds et al., 2000) (See Appendix 2).
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAPS; Ziemond & Snaith. 1983). 
The HADS is a 14 item self-report rating scale designed initially for use with 
people with physical illness. Seven items measure depression and seven items 
measure anxiety. It has been thought to be particularly useful as a tool to measure 
distress relatively independently of the impact of physiological or cognitive 
components. The scale has been found to have robust psychometric properties 
(Dagnan, Trower & Chadwick, 2000). Obsessive-compulsive symptoms have 
been linked with anxiety and depression (Salkovskis, 1985) so this scale 
constitutes an appropriate measure of negative affect (See Appendix 2).
Demographic Information. Items assessing age and gender were included in the 
questionnaire battery.
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Procedure
Participants
University students were given a brief outline of the research at lectures and asked 
to participate voluntarily by filling in the questionnaire battery. It was made clear 
that the information they provided would be anonymous (completed measures 
were not identified by name and were returned to university departments in 
unmarked envelopes).
RESULTS
Missing Values
If over 5% of values were missing on a variable for a particular case, that case 
was not used in any analysis (through list wise deletion of cases - SPSS version 
10). When less than 5% of observations were missing from a variable, the 
missing values were replaced with the mean variable score. There was no 
observed pattern to the missing data.
Age and Gender Effects
Independent t-tests were conducted on all variables grouped by gender and age 
(split by 50th percentile). OCI ratings of distress and frequency for each subscale 
item were multiplied then summed for each subscale, to create a frequency
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weighted distress OCI score, as recommended by the authors for the scale (see 
Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary & Brigidi, 2001). T-values and degrees of 
freedom were adjusted for heterogeneous variances as required. No results were 
significant for gender analysis. However two results were significant for the age 
analysis. Total obsessional symptoms (frequency/distress) were significantly 
higher in the younger age group [t(132)=-2.08, p<0.05)], as were hoarding 
symptoms [ t(105.4)=-2.85, p<0.01)].
Scale Descriptives and Group Differences
Means standard deviations were calculated for the sample (see Table 2.1). The 
observed values of all subscales fell within ranges to be expected from previous 
psychometric studies. Cronbachs alphas were calculated for Belief, OCD 
symptom, and anxiety and depression subscales. All scales demonstrated 
moderate to excellent internal consistency: OBQ (.84 to .92), OCI Distress (.61 to 
.85), OCI Frequency (.70 to .85), HADS Anxiety (.81) and HADS Depression 
(.80) (see Table 2.1).
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TABLE 2.1. Scale Alphas, Means, and Standard Deviation.
«=133-6 A lphas M (SD )
H A D S - A .81 7.79 (3 .70 )
H A D S - D .80 4.00 (2 .99 )
OCI - TO T  (F) .94 27.23 (19 .48)
OC1 - O BS(F) .81 .72 (.6 1 )
OCI - W A S(F) .85 .42 (.54 )
OCI - C H E  (F) .81 .61 (.5 5 )
OCI - N EU  (F) .70 .45 (.50 )
OCI - O R D  (F) .83 .86 (.8 1 )
OCI - H R D  (F) .79 1.06 (.91 )
OCI - D B T  (F) .70 .81 (.77 )
OCI - T O T  (D) .93 19.39 (17 .87)
OCI - O B S(D ) .82 .70 ( 6 9 )
OCI - W A S(D ) .83 .28 (.47 )
OCI - C H E  (D) .82 .38 (.47 )
OCI - N EU  (D) .61 .31 ( 3 7 )
OCI - O R D  (D) .83 .55 (.6 5 )
OCI - H R D  (D) .62 .55 (.6 4 )
OCI - D B T  (D) .69 .62 (.7 2 )
OBQ - T O T .97 220.77 (76 .04 )
OBQ -TO L .84 36.59 (11 .77 )
OBQ - TH E .89 31.52 (13 .94 )
OBQ - CO N .88 34.36 (13 .80 )
OBQ - IM P .88 26.95 (12 .04 )
OBQ - RES .89 44.62 (1 7 .2 0 )
OBQ - PER .92 46.73 (1 8 .4 7 )
Key: HADS-A = HADS Anxiety, HADS-D = HADS Depression, OC1 = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory, (D) = Distress, 
(F) = Frequency, OBS = Obsessions, WAS = Washing, CHE = Checking, NEU = Neutralising, ORD = Ordering, HRD= 
Hoarding, DBT = Doubting, TOT = Subscale total, OBQ= Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire, TOL = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, THE = Overestimation of threat, CON = Need to Control Thoughts, IMP = Overimportance of Thoughts, RES 
= Inflated Responsibility, PER = Perfectionism.
51
Association between Obsessional Belief Domains
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to determine the strength of 
association between the belief scales of the OBQ (See Table 2.2).
Table 2.2. Correlation between OBQ subscalesa
O B Q  Subscales OBQ-TOL O B Q -TH E OBQ-CON OBQ-IM P O B Q -R E S O BQ-PER
O BQ-TO L -
O BQ-TH E .74* -
O BQ-CO N .73* .75* -
O BQ -IM P .71* .77* .81* -
O BQ-RES .77* .69* .66* .64* -
O BQ -PER .74* .69* .70* .69* .64*
Note: * (n=136) * Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)
Key: OBQ= Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire, TOL = Intolerance o f Uncertainty, THE = Overestimation o f threat, 
CON = Need to Control o f thoughts, IMP = Overimportance of Thoughts, RES = Inflated Responsibility, PER = 
Perfectionism.
Correlations between OBQ subscales ranged between .64 and .81 with an average 
of .72. All were statistically significant (p<0.001). This degree o f correlation 
would make determining the importance of specific beliefs difficult because the 
effects of individual beliefs would be confounded. It has been recommended that 
researchers should think carefully about including any variables with a bivariate 
correlation of .70 in the same regression analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989). The 
use of principal component analysis to obtain, a smaller set o f  unrelated 
independent variables, is suggested to be an effective method o f dealing with 
multicollinearity problems (Stevens, 1996).
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Principal Components Analysis o f Belief Domains
Principal component analysis o f the six OBQ belief domain subscales was 
conducted. The first component had an Eigenvalue of 4.59 and accounted for 
80.2% of the variance. The second component had an Eigenvalue of .44. ‘Kaisers 
Criterion’ states that only components whose Eigenvalues are greater than 1 
should be retained (see Figure 2.1). A one component solution is indicated, and 
thus no rotation was performed.
Figure 2.1. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues of the OBQ subscale correlation matrix
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T ab le  2.3. C o m p o n en t m atrix  fo r O B Q  sca les
OBQ Belief Domains (n= 153) COMPONENT 1
intolerance of Uncertainty .90
Overestimation of Threat .89
Need to Control Thoughts .89
Overimportance of thoughts .88
Inflated Responsibility .84
Perfectionism .85
Table 2.3. shows the component loadings for the extracted component (partial 
correlation coefficients between the variables and component). The higher the 
absolute value of the loading, the more the component accounts for the total 
variance of scores on the variable concerned. The high observed magnitude of 
all loadings therefore suggests that the component accounts for a large part of 
the variance o f  each belief domain. Thus there is no evidence from this analysis 
that the belief domains are distinct separable constructs (which confirms the 
impression given by the correlation matrix). Consequently all belief domain 
scores were added to form a total belief score (OBQ-TOT) to be used in further 
analysis instead of individual belief domains.
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Correlations o f  Obsessional Belief with OCD Symptoms
Zero order correlations of obsessional belief (OBQ-TOT) and all obsessional 
symptoms (frequency weighted distress scores) were high and all statistically 
significant (p <0.001) (See Table 2.4). Obsessional belief was most strongly 
related to obsession symptoms, and then in descending order, doubting, ordering, 
neutralising, washing, checking and hoarding. Obsessional belief was also highly 
correlated with anxiety and depression (p<0.001). Partial correlations were 
therefore calculated between OCD symptoms, obsessional belief and depression 
and anxiety (See Table 2.4).
When the OCD symptom scores were partialled out, correlations between 
obsessional belief and depression and anxiety dropped but remained significant. 
When depression and anxiety scores were partialled out, correlations between 
obsessional belief and OCD symptoms also dropped but remained highly 
significant (p<0.001). Overall OCD symptoms were more strongly related to 
obsessional beliefs, when anxiety and depression were partialled out, than anxiety 
and depression were related to obsessional belief, when obsessional symptoms 
were partialled out. These results therefore support the specific relationship 
between obsessional beliefs and OCD symptoms rather than a general relationship 
of obsessional belief with negative affect.
As noted above correlations of the obsessional belief score and all OCD scores, 
controlled for anxiety and depression, were all significant (p<0.001). With the 
effects of anxiety and depression partialled out, obsessional belief was most
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Correlations o f  Obsessional Belief with OCD Symptoms
Zero order correlations of obsessional belief (OBQ-TOT) and all obsessional 
symptoms (frequency weighted distress scores) were high and all statistically 
significant (p <0.001) (See Table 2.4). Obsessional belief was most strongly 
related to obsession symptoms, and then in descending order, doubting, ordering, 
neutralising, washing, checking and hoarding. Obsessional belief was also highly 
correlated with anxiety and depression (p<0.001). Partial correlations were 
therefore calculated between OCD symptoms, obsessional belief and depression 
and anxiety (See Table 2.4).
When the OCD symptom scores were partialled out, correlations between 
obsessional belief and depression and anxiety dropped but remained significant. 
When depression and anxiety scores were partialled out, correlations between 
obsessional belief and OCD symptoms also dropped but remained highly 
significant (p<0.001). Overall OCD symptoms were more strongly related to 
obsessional beliefs, when anxiety and depression were partialled out, than anxiety 
and depression were related to obsessional belief, when obsessional symptoms 
were partialled out. These results therefore support the specific relationship 
between obsessional beliefs and OCD symptoms rather than a general relationship 
of obsessional belief with negative affect.
As noted above correlations of the obsessional belief score and all OCD scores, 
controlled for anxiety and depression, were all significant (p<0.001). With the 
effects of anxiety and depression partialled out, obsessional belief was most
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strongly related to obsession symptoms, and then in descending doubting, 
washing, ordering and equally (neutralising, hoarding and checking) symptoms 
(see Table 2.4). The overall correlation between obsessional belief and the OCD 
symptom total score was .57, indicating a high degree of relationship of 
obsessional belief to OCD symptoms, independent o f  the effect of anxiety and 
depression. As there was no evidence in this study that individual belief domains 
were distinct constructs, correlations of individual belief domains and OCD 
symptom scores are not reported in the table. They were all significant (p<0.05) as 
might be expected.
Table 2.4. Zero Order and Partial Correlations between Obsessive Belief, OCD 
symptoms and Mood.
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory
HA-A HA-D OBS WAS CHE NEU ORD HRD DBT OCI-TOT
Zero order 
correlations 
OBQ (n=133) 
OBQ -TOT .49*** .47*** .62*** .45*** .44*** .46*** .49*** .42*** .59*** 70***
Partial Partial out OCI Partial out HADS
correlations
OBQ (n=130) 
OBQ -TOT .24** .19* .49*** 3 7 * * * J l* * * J l* * * .34*** J l* * * .45*** .57***
Key: HADS-A = HADS Anxiety, HADS-D = MADS Depression, OBS = Obsessions, WAS = Washing, CHE 
= Checking, NEU = Neutralising, ORD = Ordering, HRD= Hoarding, DBT = Doubting,, OBQ = Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire, OCI= Obsessive Compulsive Inventory, TOT = Subscales total,
• p<0.05., ••P<0.01, ***P<0.001
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DISCUSSION
Relationships between individual belief domains
A high degree of correlation was observed between all belief domains and this 
result will form the main part of the discussion. The result replicates previous 
findings (Steketee et al., 1998a; OCCWG, 2001) and is consistent with other 
studies that have indicated close relationships between domains (noted above). 
The OCCWG (2001) proposed that factor analysis ‘will be required to examine 
both the a priori consensus based structure and the actual factor structure 
underlying the scales.’ Few studies have previously examined the proposed 
multidimensionality of OCD relevant belief domains. Principal components 
analyses of a cognitive intrusions questionnaire has found factors that have been 
interpreted as inflated responsibility, importance of thought control, 
overestimation of threat and intolerance of uncertainty domains (Freeston, 
Ladoceur, Thibodeau & Gagnon, 1992; Freeston, Ladoceur, Gagnon & 
Thibodeau, 1993). In contrast, a principal component analysis of another scale 
measuring OCD related beliefs, suggested that intolerance of uncertainty beliefs 
merged with other obsessional beliefs (including one similar to overestimation of 
threat), to form a single factor (Sookman & Pinard, 1995; Sookman, Pinard & 
Engelsmann, 1997 -  cited by the OCCWG, 1997).
The principal components analysis o f  the belief domain subscales in the current 
study suggests that the belief domains identified by the OCCWG (1997), merge
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together to form a single factor. Further studies are needed to verify or refute this 
finding which include sufficient participants to enable individual items to be used 
in factor analysis. It is possible that a larger scale, finer grained analysis, with 
clinical participants may lead to different conclusions. Another possibility is that 
the close relationship between belief domains observed may be due to properties 
of the OBQ scales. Items were selected partly on the basis o f their content validity 
assessed by repeated expert review and partly on the basis o f their high correlation 
with OCD symptom measures. This would tend, in contrast to factor analytic 
techniques of scale development, to emphasise the similarities between domains 
rather than their differences. In addition priming was not used to assess beliefs 
(i.e. specifying the context for which respondents should make ratings). For some 
people, danger related beliefs may only be activated in threatening situations 
(Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). It is plausible that the lack of priming may 
have increased the observed relationships between belief domains.
It is also possible that the belief domains do indeed have one underlying 
dimension that may exist at a deeper level of cognition. Beck (1987) suggests that 
dysfunctional schema assumptions have at least two levels. At one level are 
propositional, rule or attitude statements, which correspond to a ‘beliefs’ level of 
cognition proposed by the OCCWG, (1997). At a deeper level there are absolute 
concepts that are not conditional referred to as core beliefs (or schema) which are 
generally less accessible to consciousness. Belief domain contents in OCD may 
therefore be manifestations of a more fundamental dysfunctional schema. 
Mallinger (1984) has previously emphasised the centrality o f the obsessional need
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for control. He argues that the pre-obsessional child cannot trust external reality 
and deals with this by ‘substituting a defensive irrational belief in his own 
potential omnipotence.’ Similarly Frost et al. (1993) observed that obsessional 
patients may mistakenly perceive ‘that it is possible to have control over events 
which are largely random or at least controlled by circumstances outside the realm 
of influence.’ It could be speculated that a common theme linking each proposed 
belief domain might be conceived of as a core belief that both internal and 
external events can be controlled to an exaggerated (even magical) degree.
The relationship o f  obsessional beliefs to OCD symptoms
The principal aims of the study were to discover the relative importance of belief 
domains in explaining variance in OCD symptoms overall, and the relative 
associations between belief domains and symptoms subtypes. The lack of 
empirical support for the assumed multidimensionality o f OCD beliefs however 
challenges the notion that it is possible to discover reliable answers to these 
questions at the current time. The results did indicate however that obsessional 
belief overall was significantly related to all symptoms of OCD, and this was true 
when results were controlled for anxiety and depression. A strength o f the current 
study was its use of a measure that assesses a wide range of OCD symptoms. With 
the effects of anxiety and depression partialled out, obsessional belief was most 
strongly related to obsession symptoms, and then in descending doubting, 
washing, ordering and equally (neutralising, hoarding and checking) symptoms. 
This suggests that obsessional belief is particularly relevant to obsession
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symptoms and may be relatively less important for washing, checking and 
neutralising. These results are consistent with the findings of the OCCWG (2001), 
in so far as it is possible to make comparison between different symptom 
measures. However it must be emphasised that further replication with a reliably 
diagnosed clinical samples is necessary. Future studies also need to use similar 
measures of symptoms, as well as beliefs, to facilitate comparisons.
Overall the results suggest the importance of obsessional belief in all OCD 
symptoms. A moderate to high correlation between obsessional belief and the 
OCD symptom total score was observed, independent of the effect of anxiety and 
depression, suggesting a strong and specific relationship between them. This 
conclusion must be qualified by noting that belief domain items were partly 
chosen on the basis o f their correlation with OCD symptoms which would bias 
results in the observed direction. The current study did however use a different 
measure of OCD symptoms than the one used for validation, and found stronger 
relationships overall. Another issue is that by implication all ‘individual beliefs’ 
are associated with all symptom subtypes, but belief domains were not of course 
found to be identical, and there is undoubtedly some unique variance attributable 
to each. In view of the above results it seems necessary to conduct more research 
to establish the nature of relationship between domains before confident 
statements can be made about the relative importance of domains or their 
relationship to symptom profiles. Finally as with all correlational studies the 
results do not confirm that beliefs are causative factors in obsessional symptoms. 
However studies that have manipulated obsessional beliefs and observed
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consequent changes in OCD variables would tend to suggest this (e.g. Lopatka & 
Rachman, 1995; Shafran, 1997; Rassinetal., 1999).
Clinical Implications
The current research suggests that belief domains identified by the OCCWG are 
less distinct than supposed. However these domains have considerable content 
validity according to the expert consensus of a large group of eminent OCD 
clinicians. Even if the above results are replicated, it may remain clinically 
practical to consider beliefs separately as cognitive techniques can only be 
developed to target specific domains (i.e. Freeston et al., 1996). Salkovskis (1985; 
1989) has proposed that responsibility appraisals are essential for the development 
of obsessions. There is evidence that most other belief domains are implicated in 
other anxiety disorders and are not specific to OCD (with the exception of the 
importance of controlling thought beliefs). To date there is evidence cognitive 
techniques targeting inflated responsibility beliefs alone (Ladoceur, Leger, 
Rhéaume, & Dube, 1996) and danger related beliefs alone (Jones & Menzies, 
1998b), in OCD patients (without exposure and response prevention) is associated 
with a reduction in symptoms. The results of the current study imply that belief 
modification in one domain would have corresponding effects on the others. 
Overall, the research suggests that targeting other ‘belief domains’ may also be 
successful over the whole spectrum of OCD symptoms. Belief modification 
techniques may facilitate traditional exposure response therapies or provide a 
viable alternative. However these results do need replication in clinical groups.
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Another implication of the research is that there may be a common obsessional 
schema. Recent trends in cognitive therapy, based on work with challenging client 
groups, have emphasised the need for interventions directed at modifying schemas 
(e.g. Beck & Freeman, 1990; Young, 1994). The challenging nature of the OCD 
patient group, the lack of consistently effective therapies, and the need for 
schematic restructuring with OCD patients have all been highlighted by Sookman 
et al. (1994). Identification of obsessional schema, that account for the 
relationships between domains, would facilitate therapy focusing on schematic 
restructuring. In contrast to therapy focusing on more peripheral beliefs or 
behavioural symptoms, this may result in greater clinical improvements.
Conclusion
In summary, it was found that the six belief domains loaded strongly on one 
component. A summed belief domain score was significantly related to all 
measured OCD symptoms, with the effects o f  anxiety and depression partialled 
out. Clinical implications are that all belief domains may be useful targets of 
cognitive interventions and attention to deeper levels of cognition may be 
warranted. Further research is necessary, especially with clinical groups, to 
determine whether the observed relationship between belief domains results from 
properties of the OBQ or an actual lack of distinction between them.
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Summary - The aim of the present study was to determine the psychometric 
properties of the Ego-Dystonicity Questionnaire in a sample including British 
student and clinical participants. The component structure partially replicates that 
obtained previously by Cripps & Purdon (2000), with Canadian students. Some 
differences are noted however.
P rin c ip a l C om ponen ts A nalysis o f th e  Ego-D ystonicity  Q u es tio n n a ire
INTRODUCTION
Thoughts are said to be ego-dystonic if they are incompatible with a persons 
ideals or self-conception (Rycroft, 1968). Normal intrusive thoughts have been 
found to differ from clinical obsessions on a dimension labelled ‘alieness to self 
(Rachman & De Silva, 1978) and it has been suggested that obsessive thoughts 
and ‘morbid preoccupations’ may be distinguished in terms o f their ego-dystonic 
versus ego-syntonic character (Rachman, 1973). Ego-dystonicity of thoughts has 
subsequently served as a defining feature of obsessions, especially in comparison 
to worries (APA, 1994; Borkovec, 1994; Langlois el al., 2000a; Turner et al., 
1992; Wells & Morrison, 1994). Empirical studies have shown ego-dystonicity to 
be predictive of escape/avoidance responses thought to be characteristic of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Freeston el al., 1991; Freeston & Ladoceur, 1993; 
Langlois el al., 2000b) and of frequency of intrusive thoughts (Clark & 
Clayboum, 1997). Recently ego-dystonicity has been proposed as one of several 
constructs implicated in the aetiology and persistence of obsessions (Purdon &
Clark, 1999; Clark, 2000). It has been suggested that that the appraisal of a 
thought being ego-dystonic may represent a threat to self-view (Purdon & Clark, 
1999; O’Keamey 1998). This interpretations it is suggested may lead to efforts at 
controlling the thoughts, that because of paradoxical thought suppression effects 
would be doomed to fail (Wegner et a i, 1987), and thus lead to a vicious cycle.
Given the significance o f  ego-dystonicity in defining obsessions and evidence of 
its potential role in the development of obsessions the concept seems relatively 
under explored. In studies to date it has only been examined with a single item in 
non-clinical populations. An Ego-Dystonicity Questionnaire has recently been 
developed however (EDQ: Cripps & Purdon, 2000) and the authors suggest it is a 
multi-dimensional construct. They propose that the scale may aid appropriate 
treatment decision-making and develop understanding of the ‘escalation and 
persistence o f obsessions’. The aim of the present study is to examine the factor 
structure of the EDQ with British students and clinical participants.
METHOD
Subjects
116 university students (many mature), took part in the study voluntarily (mean 
age = 29.4, SD=10.9, male = 28, female = 88).
Procedure
All participants completed the 37-item EDQ (Cripps & Purdon, 2000). It 
measures the appraisal o f a thought as ‘being inconsistent with ones personality, 
habits, preferences and thoughts one would expect oneself to have, as well as 
one’s affective response to the thoughts content’. Participants rate a self-identified 
ego-dystonic thought on a seven-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (7). Greater scores reflect greater ego-dystonicity. Four subscales 
[Inconsistency with Morals (Cronbach's Alpha = .85), Dislike of Thought 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .79), Irrationality of Thought (Cronbach’s Alpha = .86), and 
Implications of Thought for Personality (Cronbach’s Alpha = .66)] have emerged 
previously from a principal components analysis of 151 student participants 
(Cripps & Purdon, 2000).
RESULTS
Principal Components Analysis
Principal component analysis (with direct oblimin rotation) of the 37 EDQ items 
was carried out for all participants (replicating methodology used by Cripps & 
Purdon, 2000). It has been suggested that examination of the scree plot is agreed
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by many factor analysts to be the preferred solution to selecting the correct 
amount of factors (Kline, 1994). In this case examination o f the scree plot shows a 
break in the slope of the Eigenvalues after four components, indicating a four- 
component solution (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. Plot of Eigenvalues of the EDQ item correlation matrix
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P r i n c i p a l  C o m p o n e n t s
A criterion loading o f >. 40 was used as the level of component loading 
significance to make findings comparable with previous analysis and ensure each 
item only loaded on one factor (See Table 3.1). The amount of items loading on 
each factor, the strength of loadings, and sample size suggest that the obtained 
four component solution would be stable across samples according to criteria
suggested by Guadagnoli & Velicer (1988). It accounted for 53% of the variance 
in EDQ items. Component 1, with an Eigen value of 11.10 accounted for 30% of 
the variance and had loadings on 10 items (17, 15, 19, 31, 30,4, 21, 26, 28,13). 
This component is characterised as ‘Implications of Thought for Personality’ as it 
essentially replicates loadings found by Cripps & Purdon (2000), with the 
exception of four new items (19, 26, 30, 31). Component 2 had an Eigenvalue of 
4.28, accounted for 11.55% of the variance, and had loadings on 8 items (27, 32, 
37, 16, 29, 25, 34, 3). This component is characterised as ‘Dislike of Thought’ as 
it essentially replicates loadings found by Cripps & Purdon (2000), with the 
exception that items 32, 37, and 3 are included and item 30 is excluded. 
Component 3, had an Eigen value of 2.36, accounted for 6.4% of the variance and 
loaded on 9 items (7, 5, 6, 9, 11, 2, 23, 24and 35). This component is 
characterised as ‘Inconsistency with Morals' as it essentially replicates loadings 
found by Cripps & Purdon (2000), with the exception that it differs on four items: 
it includes items 11 and 2 and excludes 32 and 36. Component 4 had an Eigen 
value of 1.90 and accounted for 5.11% of the variance and loaded on 5 items (8, 1, 
14, 33, and 22). This component is characterised as ‘Irrationality of Thought’ as it 
essentially replicates loadings found by Cripps & Purdon (2000), with the 
exception that it excludes items 31,10 and 11.
Table 3.1. The component structure (oblique rotation) of the EDQ*
KDQ 1TKM__________________________________________________________
1. EDQ.17 I need to prove to myself that I am not the kind of person this 
thought suggests I could be.
2. EDQ. 15 It bothers me that I cannot get rid of this thought more easily, 
given that it is so irrational.
3. EDQ19. The more I have this thought, the more I worry it is going to come 
true despite my best intentions.
4. EDQ3I. A person like me should not have thoughts like this.
5. EDQ30.1 typically do just about anything to get this thought out of my 
head the moment I become aware of it.
6. EDQ4 The more I have this thought, the more 1 worry that I will do it 
despite my efforts at self-control.
7. EDQ.21 When I have this thought, I begin to question my view of myself.
8. EDQ26. When I have this thought, I must get it out o f  my mind as quickly 
as possible and keep it out.
9. EI3Q28. Even though this thought goes against my personality, it doesn’t 
mean anything at all.
10. EDQ 13.1 would be a better person if I did not have thoughts like this.
11. EDQ27. This thought does not reflect my fantasies.
12. EDQ32.The more I have this thought, the more I wonder if part of me wants 
it to come true
13. EDQ37. The more I have this thought the more I worry that maybe part of 
me wants it to come true.
14. EDQ 16. There is nothing appealing to me about this thought coming true in 
real life.
15. EDQ29.I would never want this to happen in real life.
16. EDQ25.1 would never voluntarily do anything that might make this 
thought come true in real life.
17. EDQ.34 This thought makes my stomach turn.
18. EDQ3. When I have this thought, I typically do something to assure myself 
that the thought has not or will not come true in real life.
19. EDQ7. This thought is immoral.
20. EDQ5.This thought is upsetting because it violates my sense o f morality 
and decency
21. EDQ6. This thought conflicts with my personality, or , my sense of ‘who I 
am.’
22. EDQ9. I have never acted out his thought in my life.
23. EDQ11. This is not the kind of thought I would expect to have
24. EDQ2. I wonder how a person like me could have a thought like this
25. EDQ23. This thought violates my sense of what is right.
26. EDQ24. This is not the kind of thought I would expect myself to have and 
so it is rather alarming to me
27. EDQ35.1 am immoral for having this thought.
28. EDQ8. Even though this thought is distressing I understand why I have it
29. EDQ1. It doesn’t make any sense to me that I would have a thought like 
this
30. EDQ14.1 can’t think of any good reason as to why I have a thought like 
this.
31. EDQ33. This thought takes me completely by surprise.
32. EDQ22. This thought is irrational, so I don't understand why I would have 
it.
COMPONENT
_ 1 ________2 3
.68
.60
.60
.60
.58
.55
-.72
.71
-.65
-.61
-.55
-.53
-.43
-.80
-.73
-.73
-.62
-.61
-.60
-.51
-.46
-.44
-.80
.71
.70
.55
.53
•Component loadings < 0.40 are excluded
Analysis o f  difference
Some differences to the Cripps and Purdon study are worth noting (see Table 3.2). 
The order of extraction changed from Inconsistency with Morals, Irrationality of 
Thought, Dislike of Thought, and Implications of Thought for Personality (Cripps 
& Purdon, 2000) to Implications of Thought for personality, Dislike of Thought, 
Inconsistency with Morals, and Irrationality of Thought. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of ego-dystonicity in the development of obsessions is the threat 
to self-view/implications for personality component as outlined by Purdon &
Clark (1999). A possible speculation is that the British sample had a greater 
degree of obsessional symptoms than the Canadian sample and thus importance of 
the Implications of Thought for Personality factor was emphasised in this 
analysis.
T a b le  3 . 2 . C o m p a riso n  o f  o rd e r  o f  item  lo ad in g s  a n d  c o m p o n e n t e x tra c tio n  o b ta in e d  b y  C rip p s  &  
P u rd o n  (2 0 0 0 )  a n d  th e  c u rre n t s tu d y .*
Component Cripps & Purdon (2000)8 Current study b
1. Inconsistency with Morals (2 3 ,5 ,7 ,6 ,9 ,32, 35, 24. 36) ( 7,  5,  6,  9,  II, 2, 23 ,  24,  35)
2. Irrationality of Thought (14 ,22 ,8 , 1,33, 10,31, 11) (8,  l, 14,  33 . 22)
3. Dislike of thought (25. 29, 16.27,30.34) ( 27,  32, 37, 16, 29,  25 ,  34 ,  3)
4.Implications for personality (17. 4 ,15 ,21 .28 ,13) ( 17, 15,  19, 31, 30, 4,  21 . 26, 28 , 13)
*Shared Items in Bold
8 Solution accounted for 49.6% of variance. Order of component extraction (1, 2, 3, 4). 
b Solution accounted for 53% of variance. Order of component extraction (4,3, 1,2).
The differences in item loadings suggest slight differences in characterisation of 
components but were not thought sufficient to change the original scoring or
characterisations (see Table 3.2). The Inconsistency of Morals component shares 
four initial items. It includes two new items that seem to reflect surprise at having 
the thought, but are consistent with the component: item 11 (“This is not the kind 
of thought I expect to have”) and item 2 (“1 wonder how a person like me could 
have a thought like this”). Two items are omitted (32/36) which do not appear to 
particularly reflect the inconsistency with morals component and load higher on 
another component/or moderately on all other components. The ‘Irrationality of 
Thought’ component has the same first five loading items in each analysis. Three 
items are omitted (10,11,31) which do not seem to capture the idea of Irrationality 
of thought, and all in fact load higher on other components. The ‘Dislike of 
Thought’ component is perhaps the component which show greatest difference in 
this analysis. It includes three new items that load negatively in third and sixth 
place respectively. They are item 32 (“The more I have this thought the more I 
wonder if  part of me wants it to come true”) and item 37 (“The more I have this 
thought the more I worry if part of me wants it to come true”). These negatively 
loading items suggest disownership as well as dislike of the thought in the sense 
of denial that there is any personal truth in the thought. It also includes item 3 
which reflects the need for assurance that the thought will not come true. The 
implications of Thought for Personality' subscale includes four new items that 
are consistent with the characterisation. Item 19 (“The more I have this thought 
the more I worry that it is going to come true despite my best intentions”) is 
consistent in the sense that it implies concern that thought may be part of 
personality. It also suggests additional fears of losing control that is also a 
characteristic of the component items in the first analysis. Item 31 (“A person like
me should not have thoughts like this”) is entirely consistent with the 
characterisation. The remaining items (26, 30) emphasis is on taking action to 
dispel the thought. This is consistent with theoretical speculation that dystonie 
appraisals concerning implications of thought for personality lead to efforts to 
prove otherwise - and thus are implicated the development o f obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (Purdon & Clark, 1999). These items may create conceptual 
confusion however because of the possible confound of appraisal and symptom.
DISCUSSION
Overall the results of the present study largely replicate the data obtained by 
Cripps & Purdon (2000) by providing evidence that Inconsistency with Morals, 
Irrationality of Thought, Dislike of Thought, and Implications of Thought for 
Personality represent meaningful domains in a British sample. There are slight 
differences to the characterisation of components but these are not sufficient to 
suggest modification o f  the EDQ, especially as the current study was conducted 
with a smaller sample. At this stage of research similarities between analyses are 
emphasised rather than differences. Therefore use of the original scoring is 
recommended. However the need for further research is indicated, especially with 
reliably diagnosed obsessional samples, to develop the EDQ as a promising 
clinical assessment and research tool.
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R eflections on  O C D  beliefs research
Introduction
Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) broadly assert that it is 
the negative appraisal of intrusive thoughts not their occurrence per se that leads 
to symptoms. Researchers have become increasingly interested therefore in beliefs 
and assumptions that may lead to negative appraisal so they may be the targets of 
cognitive interventions. My interest in this field grew from early clinical 
experiences in psychology and I propose to consider how they, and subsequent 
familiarisation with literature, shaped my research as a clinical psychology 
trainee. I will then raise some of the wider theoretical issues and reflections that 
have occurred to me during the research process. Finally I will reflect on how this 
process, including the result of the research itself, may have influenced me as a 
researcher and practitioner.
Early Enthusiasm
My first clinical experiences as an assistant psychologist were in a group for 
clients with OCD, assisting members in the group and in individual sessions, with 
exposure and response prevention goals. Reading a seminal paper by Salkovksis 
(1985), outlining how inflated responsibility appraisals were essential to the 
development of OCD, proved to be a formative experience in appreciating how 
theory guided practice. Through building alternative non-threatening accounts of
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their symptoms using cognitive and behavioural theory, I saw how clients were 
able to overcome problems, which had often been thought intractable by clients 
and professionals alike. Salkovskis’ CBT model of OCD seemed to be a shining 
example of the clinical psychological approach. Practical theories were derived 
through observation of clinical phenomenology and experimental studies. It 
seemed to me that cognitive-behavioural therapy helped clients overcome severely 
disabling symptoms, and this was in stark contrast to the general therapeutic 
nihilism derived from psychoanalysis.
Early Doubts
The opportunity to engage in longer-term work with clients, who had mostly 
resolved their obsessional symptoms, brought new questions. Clients often 
seemed to have considerable residual interpersonal difficulties and struggled with 
issues of dependence, control, sexuality and anger. It did not seem fanciful to 
think that the themes of obsessions often were closely connected to these 
difficulties, and may have more meaning than the cognitive model implied. In 
addition inflated responsibility beliefs did not seem universally present in clients 
with OCD symptoms, and I speculated that 1 might have been trying too hard to 
‘fit’ the model to clients. Clearly a structured CBT approach had enormous 
success in tackling symptoms and explaining their maintenance, but I wondered if 
a more exploratory approach would be appropriate to help clients resolve 
relationship difficulties that may cause relapse.
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Shaping Research Questions
The cognitive-behavioural OCD literature suggested that beliefs other than 
inflated responsibility were important in the development of obsessional 
problems. A group of international OCD experts had agreed that six belief 
domains including inflated responsibility were likely to be relevant (OCCWG, 
1997). Closer scrutiny of the evidence for the importance of responsibility beliefs 
also suggested this as the majority o f studies observed fairly modest correlations 
with symptoms. This dispelled the impression gained from much of the literature 
that responsibility beliefs were essential for the development of OCD. I reflected 
however that their importance was already being enshrined in clinical mythology. 
My curiosity was stimulated about proposals that other beliefs or assumptions 
were relevant, and may even rival the importance of responsibility beliefs. This 
formed the basis for the current research. Before returning to this question two 
additional areas of interest will be mentioned.
Psychoanalytic Contributions
As CBT research seemed predominantly concerned with maintenance rather than 
with aetiology of OCD, the origins o f  beliefs seemed obscure. For instance how 
did seemingly bizarre thought action-fusion beliefs (including the notion that 
thoughts can increase the probability o f  events) originate? I wondered what the 
psychoanalytic literature might suggest and the notion o f ‘omnipotence of 
thoughts’, described by Freud, appeared to be similar. Indeed following from
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Freud’s ideas, Meares (1986) suggested that individuals with omnipotent beliefs 
have not formed a mature conception of an inner life being distinct from an outer 
world. The resulting interplay of dangers of contagion creeping in and harm 
inflicted by thoughts seeping out. he argued led to escalating anxiety and the 
construction of a 'magical counterworld’ (through rituals) to shield from dangers. 
The lack of an adequate self-boundary he hypothesised was promoted by 
overprotective parents who impeded opportunities for reality testing experiences. 
The analytic literature appeared to be far richer in terms of theory concerning the 
origins of obsessional beliefs. It seemed astonishing however that the general 
consensus, after nearly a century of thought, was that little has been added to 
Freud’s basic views (Esman, 2001). In addition the lack of symptom relief 
acheived by psychoanalytic approaches was surprising considering that OCD was 
almost a prototypical disorder in highlighting the struggle between unconscious 
drives and moral demands. Esman noted however the “virtual absence o f 
psychoanalytic contributions in the previous three decades in to the illness that 
Freud considered to be 'the most interesting and repaying object of 
psychoanalytical research.’ ”
Ego-Dyslonic Appraisals
Observations of the commonplace nature of intrusive thoughts have been 
combined with cognitive theory to suggest obsessional thinking is rooted in the 
negative interpretation of intrusions. One of the dimensions however found to 
distinguish obsessions from normal intrusive thoughts (and worries) was their 
'alien' ego-dystonic nature. Recently Purdon & Clark (1999) suggested that the
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appraisal of a thought being ego-dystonic may represent a threat to the self-view 
and ‘maybe the very thing that causes it to become an obsession.’ Similarly O’ 
Kearney (1998) suggests that intrusions, for example concerning potential 
hostility, might result in a potentially damaging self-discrepancy leading to 
neutralisation to resolve the discrepancy. While cognitive interventions through 
normalising the experience of intrusive thoughts may also reduce the dystonic 
nature of appraisals, Purdon & Clark (1999) suggested treatment might benefit 
from the additional consideration of the meaning of thoughts for self-identity. 
More controversially, O'Keamey (1998) conceives of intrusive thoughts ‘as 
responses to various contextual factors in the patients intrapsychic and 
interpersonal environment’ and proposed that a useful therapeutic strategy would 
be to explore unacknowledged emotional ambivalence. This was criticised by 
Salkovskis & Freeston (2001): ‘his proposal has the unfortunate capacity to 
increase negative appraisal and lower self-esteem without helping the sufferer 
resolve their obsessional symptoms.’ These debates stimulated my interest in the 
concept ego-dystonicity and the idea that intrusive thought may be more 
meaningful than cognitive models imply.
Motivation for Research
The development of measures of OCD relevant belief domains by the OCCWG 
(2001) made it possible to try and assess which of many beliefs were most 
important in OCD and if these beliefs are differentially associated with symptom 
profiles. In addition an opportunity presented itself to try and replicate the factor
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structure of the first available measure of ego dystonicity. Just as Salkovskis’s 
inflated responsibility model of OCD was helpful to me as 1 began clinical work, 1 
imagined this kind of research might help inform clinicians about the key beliefs 
to assess in OCD. The possibility that different belief domains would emerge as 
being associated with specific symptom subtypes seemed exciting.
Reflections on appraisal theories and the origins o f  intrusive thoughts
At various times in the research process I struggled to describe the relationship of 
beliefs to negative appraisals. Do beliefs underlie, motivate, result in, influence, or 
cause appraisals? Mackay (1995) suggests that although cognitive therapies try to 
appear solidly scientific statements about beliefs are not sufficient for explanation. 
Similarly McNally (2001) notes explanations in terms of beliefs and catastrophic 
misinterpretations beg the question about what causes them, and are thus ‘only the 
beginning the enquiry.’ O’ Kearney ( 1998) criticises cognitive-behavioural 
theories of OCD specifically for not seriously considering factors that may 
account for the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. As noted he argues that intrusive 
thoughts ‘have a substantive relationship with the sufferers concerns’ and thus 
cognitive theories ignore their thematic significance. In response to this critique 
Salkovkis & Freeston (2001) suggest that production of intrusive thoughts is part 
of a problem solving process: “That is a stream of ideas are spontaneously 
generated around current concerns by an ‘idea generator’.” O ’Kearney (2001) 
however notes the “non-committal stance on relationship between obsession and 
concerns implied by the word 'around' ” and argues the vagueness is a result of
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misguided commitment to the idea that obsessions are initially emotionally 
neutral. These exchanges become increasingly polarised, but served to deepen my 
awareness about possible theoretical shortcomings of appraisal theories. It seems 
fair to suggest that cognitive models could be clearer about causality and the 
possible origins of relevant assumptions. For instance, the resort to explanatory 
concepts like ‘idea generators' begs even more questions. It also seems fair 
however to point out, as Salkovskis does, that attention to the origins of intrusive 
thoughts has generated little in the way of successful therapeutic strategies.
Initial Data
Returning to the more practical task of recruiting participants I began to 
understand why the majority of knowledge of cognitive processes in OCD is 
derived from student populations. After obtaining ethical permission from three 
NHS trusts, telephoning clinicians, sending information, telephoning again, and 
feeling like a salesman for my research over many months, 1 was rewarded with 
12 clinical participants. As data was collected my interest in the possible results 
grew. It was paralleled however by the increasing recognition that previous 
studies o f OCD relevant beliefs indicated that the belief domains are highly 
related. I felt uneasy thinking about the implications of this and wondered if the 
researchers in these studies felt the same way, as they acknowledged that beliefs 
might overlap but never went further. It seemed easy to suggest plausible 
interconnections between nearly all beliefs and imagine they may interact in an 
idiosyncratic manner. Appraisal theories essentially suggest a sequential process.
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of particular beliefs leading to particular appraisals which eventually results in 
symptoms. 1 wanted to find out if particular beliefs were associated with particular 
symptoms. As Mackay (1995) points out however cognitive appraisal theories 
unlike cognitive experimental theories pay ‘little attention to the syntax, the rules 
of processing, structuring and ordering of cognition.’ Again I had to consider how 
appraisal theories might considerably oversimplify reality. Perhaps they are better 
as clinically useful stories than scientific theories?
Denial o f  Results
One of the major findings of my research was a high degree of correlation 
between all belief domains. One of these studies had proceeded to use individual 
beliefs as independent variables in a regression analyses contrary to statistical 
good practice. However it crossed my mind to follow their lead! I speculated that 
researchers examining beliefs within the cognitive model of OCD have been 
trying prematurely to order, categorise and isolate complex phenomena. Were 
they ignoring the evidence? 1 was attached to the idea that specific belief domains 
may be associated with different OCD symptom profiles. It was not hard for me to 
imagine therefore that a researcher who had spent years seeking evidence for the 
importance of one belief domain may be reluctant to consider that it may be so 
highly related to other beliefs as to be virtually indistinguishable. In addition as so 
many other intervening processes are implicated in the formation of OCD 
symptoms, the possible individual permutations might be so numerous, as to 
prevent any consistent association of particular beliefs with particular symptoms.
Obsessional Schema?
My research suggested that the beliefs measured did not form separate domains I 
began to speculate about what may be a common theme and was struck by 
Mallinger’s (1984) emphasis on the obsessional need for control. He proposed 
that the pre-obsessional child, as a result o f inconsistent early experience, 
develops a defensive m yth as follows: ‘If I try hard enough, I can maintain control 
over anything and everything that might affect me, and thus protect myself from 
all potential dangers. I can  control my own thoughts, feelings and actions; the 
opinions o f  relevant others toward me; and the miscellaneous potential danger in 
life, such as illness, accidents, misfortune and even death!’ I speculated that an 
obsessional core belief, linking belief domains, would be similar to this myth and 
seemed to ‘fit’ with my experience o f OCD patients. Thus the individual belief 
domains may be emergent properties o f this core belief (which by definition 
would be less accessible to  consciousness). At the very least it is true that little 
attention had been paid to  possible obsessional core beliefs. However even if  an 
underlying core belief d id  exist and could be identified, cognitive behavioural 
therapy would begin by targeting key lower order cognitions. Changes in any 
underlying dimension at a  deeper level o f cognition may occur as a secondary 
effect of treating lower order beliefs. Mansell (2000) presents evidence to support 
the view that changes in conscious appraisal can lead to changes in automatic 
processes presumably v ia  changes in higher order beliefs or schema. However 
following cognitive theory a more direct focus on underlying schema may result 
in greater success and low er relapse rates. Purdon & Clark’s (1999) consideration
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of ego-dystonic appraisals could also imply that attention to obsession 
schema/core belief is warranted. They suggest: ‘It is possible that individuals not 
vulnerable to obsessional problems hold more varied and flexible self schemata, 
so that if  one schema is violated by the occurrence o f an inconsistent thought (i.e. 
dystonic) the self-view is less likely to be challenged.’
If such close relationships between belief domains are consistently observed and 
are not particular properties o f their measures it also suggested abandoning the 
notion that certain belief domains will be reliably associated with symptom 
profiles or a most important domain will be identified. Perhaps it also implied that 
modification o f  one ‘belief would lead to change in others, possibly via an 
underlying dimension, so at least in theory, it did not matter what belief is 
targeted. This implication has led me to consider the degree to which research can 
guide practice however. O f course formulation may be guided by the research, 
and assessment measures, but as Freeston, Rheaume & Ladocuer (1996) note:
‘individual analysis is the key to effective treatment...determining the optimal 
order for cognitive targets is a problem that can be addressed clinically.’ It 
seemed to me that an overeliance on aggregated research results in guiding 
treatment direction may lead to poor practice in the sense o f imposing models on 
patients that are not suited to their unique needs.
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How has research process affected me as researcher?
I have gained a greater understanding o f research methodologies. As a result I 
think I am more aware o f  what evidence is necessary to draw certain conclusions 
and I am more able to be critical. I am perhaps more aware that clinical ‘truths’
(or myths!) may arise as much from the momentum o f research as from empirical 
evidence. Closer scrutiny o f the actual evidence, for instance, for the importance 
o f  inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD led to me to quite different conclusions 
than the impressions 1 gained from more casual reading o f the literature. Through 
knowledge o f my own desire to find a certain type o f result, I have begun to 
appreciate how full time researchers may naturally become attached to their ideas. 
In my case I think I was drawn to finding results that may oversimplify a complex 
disorder. A greater knowledge o f the research area combined with appreciation o f  
wider theoretical criticisms has also enabled me to question some o f the 
assumptions of the cognitive behavioural theories o f OCD. Also the research 
process has increased my awareness o f  divergence between the views of 
statisticians and applied psychologists about what constitutes ‘necessary’ 
evidence. The need to understand techniques used as fully as possible has 
therefore been highlighted. At the same time I now fully appreciate the difficulties 
involved in conducting good research. It can be hard to meet all necessary 
methodological criteria especially as a practising clinician. In particular the 
obstacles involved in obtaining clinical samples are offputting. It seems a pity that 
the majority o f research in the field o f OCD is conducted with student samples. 
While understanding the need for stringent ethical processes I wonder if they
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could be graded according to potential risk o f a type of research. For instance 
asking clients to complete clinical questionnaires designed by reputable academic 
practitioners does initially seem to involve less potential risk than giving untried 
drugs to medical patients.
How has the research process affected me as practitioner?
As a practitioner I continue to have great respect for researchers’ efforts to inform 
clinical practice but perhaps have a greater appreciation o f  its limits to do so. 
Through a more in depth knowledge o f  one clinical area I think I have more 
appreciation of what actually constitutes evidence as opposed to enthusiasm for 
the ‘latest craze.’ I speculate that the worst scenario o f evidence based practice 
followed slavishly would be that clients are not understood as individuals. While I 
remain enthusiastic about a CBT approach to OCD the research process has 
shown me that that inflated responsibility beliefs are not the only beliefs that are 
strongly related to OCD symptoms. Perhaps most importantly the research has 
indicated that beliefs are highly related. This has led me to consider in much 
greater depth what m ay constitute more fundamental obsessional belief which has 
been informed by greater familiarisation with mostly psychoanalytic literature. 
This has in turn led to  greater consideration of how ‘obsessional be lief’ is 
connected to relationship issues. Thinking about the potential implications o f 
dystonic appraisals and possible treatment strategies has highlighted the conflict 
between psychodynamic and CBT treatment approaches. Would ego-dystonic 
appraisals be best reduced by normalising the experience o f  intrusive thoughts or 
by helping clients consider that intrusive thoughts may point to unacknowledged
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and important interpersonal themes? While it seems easy to dismiss 
psychodynamic theories because o f  their lack o f  therapeutic success, CBT 
theories (traditionally) seem to have little to say once symptom control is achieved 
and are not consistently effective. When clear themes are apparent between 
intrusive thoughts and a client’s concerns it seems appropriate to consider these in 
therapy and perhaps trace them to early events. It may be clinically most 
appropriate to focus on symptom control using CBT formulations in the first stage 
o f  therapy however. In my view a comprehensive treatment to would often 
involve going beyond symptom control using either a schema based or 
psychodynamic approach.
The research process has facilitated consideration of the strengths and weaknesses 
o f  different models of disorder in more depth and fostered a belief that clinicians 
using them have a lot to learn from each other (in contrast to becoming entrenched 
in dogmatic positions). Overall the process has provoked far more questions than 
it has answered and a feeling that I really need to gain more clinical experience!
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Belief domain definitions for the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire 
(OBQ: OCCWG, 2001)
Appendix B
Inflated responsibility: ‘The belief that one has power, which is pivotal to bring 
about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes are 
perceived as essential to prevent. These may be actual, tha t is having 
consequences in the real world and/or at a moral level’
Overimportance o f thoughts: ‘The belief that the mere presence o f  a thought 
indicates that it is important. Beliefs may reflect thought-action fusion and 
magical thinking’
Need to control thoughts: ‘The overvaluation of the importance o f  exerting 
complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, impulses and the belief that this 
is both possible and desirable.’
Overestimation o f threat: ‘An exaggeration o f  the probability or severity o f harm.’
Intolerance of uncertainty: ‘Beliefs about the necessity for being certain, beliefs 
that one has poor capacity to cope with unpredictable danger, and beliefs about 
the difficulty of adequate functioning in inherently ambiguous situations.’
Perfectionism: ‘The belief that there is a perfect solution to every problem, that 
doing something without mistakes is not only possible but necessary, and that 
even minor mistakes have serious consequences.’
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OBSESSIONAL BELIEFS INVENTORY
Appendix C
Thank you for agreeing to complete this questionnaire. Your contribution is valuable 
in helping to understand the nature o f beliefs that affect obsessive compulsive 
[problems and develop more effective therapies.
The questionnaire usually takes between 15 and 45 minutes to complete, and you will 
need to read the instructions for each section. Please try and answer every question. It 
is important to remember that there are no right or wrong answers. It is better to give 
your first approximate ‘gut’ response than to think too long about any question. Please 
also note that there are questions on both sides o f the page.
The complete questionnaire should be returned to your therapist in the stamped 
addressed envelope provided. Your answers are strictly confidential and your 
contribution is anonymous.
PERSONAL DETAILS
Please you could answer the following questions. It is OK to give an approximate 
answer if  you are unable to be exact.
How old are you?
What is your gender (i.e. m/f)?
How long have you had obsessional 
symptoms? (If applicable)
How many times have you received 
treatment (i.e. care episodes) from a mental 
health professional (i.e. Psychiatric Nurse, 
Psychiatrist, Clinical Psychologist, 
Counsellor, Psychotherapist, Occupational 
Therapist) for your obsessional symptoms? 
(If applicable)
OBSESSIVE BELIEFS QUESTIONNAIRE
Appendix D
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes hold. Read each statement 
carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
For each of the statements, choose the number matching the answer that best describes how you think. 
Because people arc different, there are no right or wrong answers.
To decide whether a given statement is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you 
are like most o f the time.
Use the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Disagree Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a little Agree Agree very
very much mostly little disagree or moderately much
agree
In making your ratings, try to avoid using the middle part of the scale (4), but rather indicate whether you 
usually disagree or agree with the statements about your own beliefs and attitudes.
1. Having bad thoughts or urges means I’m likely to act on them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Having control over my thoughts is a sign of good character. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. If I am uncertain, there is something wrong with me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. If I imagine something bad happening, then I am responsible for making sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
that it doesn’t happen.
5. If I don’t control my unwanted thoughts, something bad is bound to happen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. I often think things around me are unsafe. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. When I hear about a tragedy, I can’t stop wondering if I am responsible in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
some way.
8. Whenever I lose control of my thoughts, I must struggle to regain control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. I am much more likely to be punished than are others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. If I’m not absolutely sure of something, I’m bound to make a mistake. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
>11. There is only one right way to do things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. I would be a better person if I gained more control over my thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Things should be perfect according to my own standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. The more distressing my thoughts are, the greater the risk that they will come 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
true.
15. I can have no peace of mind as long as I have intrusive thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Things that are minor annoyances for most people seem like disasters for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
104
1 2 3 6 7
Disagree Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a little Agree 
very much mostly little disagree or moderately
agree
___________________________________________4___________________________ 5
[7. I must know what is going on in my mind at all times so I can control my 1 2
thoughts.
8. The more I think of something horrible, the greater the risk it will come true. 1 2
9. In order to be a worthwhile person, 1 must be perfect at everything Ido. 1 2
:0. When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things from 1 2
happening.
¡1. It is ultimately my responsibility to ensure that everything is in order. 1 2
!2. If I fail at something, I am a failure as a person. 1 2
1!3. Even if harm is very unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost. 1 2¡4. Forme, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out. 1 2
25. I must think through the consequences of even my smallest actions. 1 2
26. If an unexpected change occurs in my daily life, something bad will happen. 1 2
27. If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences. 1 2
|28. If I can’t do something perfectly, 1 shouldn’t do it at all. 1 2
29. I must be ready to regain control of my thinking whenever an intrusive thought 1 2
or image occurs.
30. Bad things are more likely to happen to me than to other people. 1 2
31. I must work to fulfil my full potential at all times. 1 2
32. It is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a situation. 1 2
33. Even minor mistakes mean a job is not complete. 1 2
.
34. If I have aggressive thoughts or impulses about my loved ones, this means I 1 2
may secretly want to hurt them.
35. I must be certain of my decisions. 1 2
36. If someone does a task better than I do, that means I failed the whole task. l 2
37. If I have an intrusive thought while I’m doing something, what I’m doing will 1 2
be ruined.
38. In all kinds of daily situations, failing to prevent harm is just as bad as 1 2
deliberately causing harm.
39. Avoiding serious problems (for example, illness or accidents) requires constant 1 2
effort on my part.
40. Small problems always seem to turn into big ones in my life. 1 2
Agree very 
much
4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
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1 2  3 4 5 6
Disagree Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a little Agree 
very much mostly little disagree or moderately
agree
11. For me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm. 1 2
(2. I should be upset if I make a mistake. 1 2
13. I should make sure others are protected from any negative consequences of my 1 2
decisions or actions.
J4. If I exercise enough will power, I should be able to gain complete control over 1 2
my mind.
J5. For me, things are not right if they are not perfect. 1 2
It6. Having nasty thoughts means I am a terrible person. 1 247. I often believe I am responsible for things that other people don’t think are my 1 2fault.I
48. If an intrusive thought pops into my mind, it must be important. 1 2
49. Thinking about a good thing happening can prevent it from happening. 1 2
50. If I do not take extra precautions, I am more likely than others to have or cause a 1 2
serious disaster.
51. If I don’t do as well as other people, that means I am an inferior person. 1 2
52. I believe that the world is a dangerous place. 1 2
53. In order to feel safe, I have to be as prepared as possible for anything that could 1 2
go wrong.
54. To avoid disasters, I need to control all the thoughts or images that pop in to my 1 2
mind.
55. I should not have bizarre or disgusting thoughts. 1 2
56. For me, making a mistake is as bad as failing completely. 1 2
57. It is essential for everything to be clear-cut, even in minor matters. 1 2
58. Having a blasphemous thought is a sinful as committing a sacrilegious act. 1 2
59. I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts. 1 2
60. I should be 100% certain that everything around me is safe. 1 2
61. Iam more likely than other people to accidentally cause harm to myself or to 1 2
others.
62. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other 1 2
people.
63. If something unexpected happens, I will not be able to cope with it. 1 2
64. Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal. 1 2
1 0 6
7
Agree very 
much
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4  5 6  7
Disagree 
very much
Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a little Agree 
mostly little disagree or moderately
agree
Agree very 
much
15. I must be the best at things that are important to me. 2 3 4 5 6 7
66. Having an unwanted sexual thought or image means I really want to do it.
■ 67. If my actions could have even a small effect on a potential misfortune, I am 
responsible for the outcome.
68. Even when I am careful, I often think that bad things will happen.
69. Having intrusive thoughts means I’m out of control.
110. It is terrible to be surprised.71. Even if I think harm is very unlikely, I should still try to prevent it.
72. Harmful event will happen unless I am very careful.
73. I should go to great lengths to get all the relevant information before I make 
decision.
174. I must keep working at something until it’s done exactly right.75. Being unable to control unwanted thoughts will make me physically ill.!| ’6. Having violent thoughts means I will lose control and become violent.|77. To me, failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it.’8. If I don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t respect me.
79. Even ordinary experiences in my life are full of risk.
10. When things go too well for me, something bad will follow.
II. If I take sufficient care, I can prevent any harmful accident from occurring.
12. When anything goes wrong in my life, it is likely to have terrible effects.
13. Having a bad thought is morally no different than doing a bad deed.
14. No matter what I do, it won’t be good enough.
15. I often think that I will be overwhelmed by unforeseen events.
16. If I don’t control my thoughts, I’ll be punished.
17. I need the people around me to behave in a predictable way.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 7
OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE INVENTORY Appendix E
The following statements refer to experiences which many people have in their everyday lives. Under the 
column labelled FREQUENCY, CIRCLE the number next to each statement that best describes how 
FREQUENTLY YOU HAVE HAD THE EXPERIENCE IN THE LAST MONTH. The numbers in this 
column refer to the following verbal labels:
0 = Never___________ 1 = Almost Never 2 = Sometimes_______ 3 = Often___________ 4 = Almost Always
Then, in the column labelled DISTRESS, CIRCLE the number that best describes HOW MUCH that 
experience has DISTRESSED OR BOTHERED YOU DURING THE LAST MONTH. The numbers in 
this column refer to the following verbal labels:
0 = Never___________ 1 = Almost Never 2 = Sometimes_______ 3 = Often___________ 4 = Almost Always
FREQUENCY DISTRESS
1. Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot 
get rid of them.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
2. I think contact with bodily secretions (perspiration, saliva, blood, urine, 
etc.) may contaminate my clothes or somehow harm me.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
3. I ask people to repeat things to me several times even though I 
understood them the first time.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
4. I wash and clean obsessively. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
S. I have to review mentally past events, conversations and actions to 
make sure that I didn’t do something wrong.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
6. I have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
7. I check things more often than necessary. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
S. I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease or 
contamination.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
9. I repeatedly check doors, windows drawers etc. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
10. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning 
them off.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
11. I collect things I don’t need. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
12. I have thoughts of having hurt someone without knowing it. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
13. I have thoughts that I might want to harm myself or others. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
14. I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
15. 1 feel obliged to follow a particular order in dressing, undressing and 
washing myself.
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
16. I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
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FREQUENCY
IT. 1 am afraid of impulsively doing embarrassing or harmful things. 0 1 2 3 4
1. I need to pray to cancel bad thoughts or feelings. 0 1 2 3 4
9. 1 keep on checking forms or other things 1 have written. 0 1 2 3 4
9. I get upset at the sight of knives, scissors and other sharp objects in case I 
lose control with them.
0 1 2 3 4
21. 1 am excessively concerned about cleanliness. 0 1 2 3 4
22. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by 
strangers or certain people.
0 1 2 3 4
23. 1 need things to be arranged in a particular order. 0 1 2 3 4
24. I get behind in my work because I repeat things over and over again. 0 1 2 3 4
25. 1 feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 0 1 2 3 4
26. After doing something carefully, I still have the impression I have not 
finished it.
0 1 2 3 4
27. 1 find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things. 0 1 2 3 4
28. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 0 1 2 3 4
29. 1 have to do things over and over again until it feels right. 0 1 2 3 4
10. 1 am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my 
will.
0 1 2 3 4
11. Before going to sleep I have to do certain things in a certain way. 0 1 2 3 4
12. 1 go back to places to make sure that I have not harmed anyone. 0 1 2 3 4
13. 1 frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them. 0 I 2 3 4
14. I avoid throwing things away because 1 am afraid I might need them later. 0 1 2 3 4
¡5. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged my things. 0 1 2 3 4
16. I feel that 1 must repeat certain words or phrases in my mind in order to 
wipe out bad thoughts, feelings or actions.
0 1 2 3 4
17. After 1 have done things, I have persistent doubts about whether 1 really 
did them.
0 1 2 3 4
¡8. 1 sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel 
contaminated.
0 1 2 3 4
19. I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 0 I 2 3 4
10. I repeatedly check anything which might cause a fire. 0 1 2 3 4
11. Even when I do something very carefully I feel that it is not quite right. 0 1 2 3 4
12. 1 wash my hands more often or longer than necessary. 0 1 2 3 4
DISTRESS
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
0 1 2  3 4
1 0 9
HAPS QUESTIONNAIRE Appendix F
ignore the numbers on each item and underline the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling 
past week. Don’t take too long over your replies, your immediate reaction to each item will probably be
■: accurate than a long thought-out response.
I tl tense or wound up: I feel as if I am slowed down:
■lost of the time
■  lot of the time
■ ime to time 
jjot at all
3 Nearly all the time 
2 Very often 
1 Sometimes 
0 Not at all
k*ill enjoy the things I used to enjoy: I get a sort of frightened feeling like butterflies in the 
stomach
«Definitely as much 
? kit quite so much 
tajDnly a little
EiLd'./ota!!..........................................
0 Not at all.
1 Occasionally
2 Quite often
3 Very often
et a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is 
|b nit to happen:
I have lost interest in my appearance:
A ery definitely and quite badly 
es, but not too badly 
i little, but it doesn’t worry me 
«ot at all
3 Definitely
2 I don’t take so much care as I should 
1 I may not take quite as much care 
0 take just as much care as ever
*in laugh and see the funny side of things I feel restless as if I have to be on the move
Is much as I always could 
Not quite as much now 
* )efinitely not so much now. 
tot at all
3 Very much indeed 
2 Quite a lot.
1 Not very much 
0 Not at all
'nrrying thoughts go through my mind: 1 look forward with enjoyment to things:
V great deal of the time 
t lot of the time
:rom time to time, but not too often 
*>nly occasionally
0 As much as I ever did
1 Rather less than I used to
2 Definitely less than 1 used to
3 Hardly at all
eel cheerful: I get sudden feelings of panic:
i tot at all 
tot often 
Sometimes.
Most of the time
3 Very often indeed. 
2 Quite often 
1 Not very often 
0 Not at all.
an sit at ease and feel relaxed: I can enjoy a good book, radio or TV programme:
' Definitely 
Usually 
'tot often 
'tot at all
0 Often.
1 Sometimes
2 Not often
3 Seldom
1 1 0
T H O U G H T S  Q U E S T IO N N A IR E Appendix G
early everyone experiences unpleasant and unwanted thoughts, although people vary in how 
iequently they occur and how distressing they are. We are interested in some o f these kinds of thoughts 
hat you may have had. These can occur in several forms, such as images, like a picture in our heads, 
mpulses to do or say something, or just thoughts about something. Specifically, we are interested in 
jnpleasant and unwanted thoughts which you perceive as inconsistent with how you view yourself. 
Such thoughts are in conflict with important parts of yourself, such as your morals, attitudes, beliefs, 
preferences, habits, behaviours, or rationality. These thoughts are not simply inconsistent with how you 
would like to view yourself; rather, they do not seem to fit with who you truly believe you are. Here are 
some examples o f  the kinds of unwanted and unpleasant thoughts which many people perceive as 
inconsistent with their personalities. 1. An individual who loves their family having a thought about 
physically attacking or harming a family member; 2. An individual having thoughts of contaminating 
others even though they know it is irrational; 3. An individual having a thought o f sexually molesting a 
child even though the idea is repugnant and they believe such an act to be immoral.
Please list a thought you have had which you perceived as unpleasant unwanted and inconsistent 
with your personality.
I
Now visualising this thought please answer the following questions in relation to it. For each of the 
statements below, circle the number matching the answer that best describes how you  think about 
it. Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers. To decide whether a given 
statement is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like most 
of the tim e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a Agree Strongly
disagree mostly little disagree or little moderately agree
agree
111. It doesn’t make any sense to me that I would have a thought like this. 
1 2. I wonder how a person like me could have a thought like this.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. When I have this thought, I typically do something to assure myself that the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
thought has not or will not come true in real life.
4. The more I have this thought, the more I worry that I will actually do it despite 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
my efforts at self-control.
5. This thought is upsetting because it violates my sense of morality and decency. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. This thought conflicts with my personality, or, my sense o f ‘who I am’. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
111
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Strongly
disagree
2
Disagree
mostly
3
Disagree a 
little
4
Neither 
disagree or 
agree
Agree a little Agree
moderately
7. This thought is immoral.
8. Even though this thought is distressing, I understand why 1 have it.
9. 1 have never acted out this thought in the past.
10. Although the thought’s content is disturbing, 1 am not disturbed by the fact that 
1 would have such a thought in the first place.
11. This is not the kind of thought I expect myself to have.
12. I never want to have this thought again.
13. I would be a better person if I did not have thoughts like this.
14. I can’t think of any good reason as to why 1 would have a thought like this.
15. It bothers me that I cannot get rid of this thought more easily, given that it is so 
irrational.
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 
1 2
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2
16. There is nothing appealing to me about this thought coming true in real life. ] 2
17. I need to prove to myself that I am not the kind of person this thought suggests j 2
I could be.
18. This thought is repulsive. j 2
19. The more I have this thought, the more I worry it is going to come true despite j 2
my best intentions.
20. This thought means I care about other people. 1 2
21. When I have this thought, I begin to question my view of myself. 1 2
22. This thought is irrational, so I don’t understand why I would have it. j 2
23. This thought violates my sense of what is right. 1 2
24. This is not the kind of thought I would expect myself to have and so it is rather j 2
alarming to me.
25. I would never voluntarily do anything that could make this thought come true j 2
in real life.
26. When I have this thought, 1 must get it out of my mind as quickly as possible j 2
and keep it out.
27. This thought does not reflect my fantasies. 1 2
28. Even though this thought goes against my personality, it doesn’t mean j 2
anything at all.
29. I would never want this thought to happen in real life. 1 2
7
Strongly
agree
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Disagree a Neither Agree a little Agree Strongly
disagree mostly little disagree or moderately agree
agree
30. I typically do just about anything to get this thought out of my head the 
moment I become aware of it.
31. A person like me should not have thoughts like this.
32. The more I have this thought, the more I wonder if part of me wants it to come 
true.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. This thought takes me completely by surprise.
This thought makes my stomach tum.
I am immoral for having this thought.
This thought is upsetting because I’ve never done anything like this before and 
never would want to in the future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. The more I have this thought, the more I worry that maybe part of me wants it 
to come true.
2 3 4 5 6 7
Thank you very much for your time.
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